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MULTICULTURALISM AND THE FUTURE OF
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
by Scott C. Idleman"
One of the most important things to understand about American Indian tribes
is the simple fact that tribes are governments-not non-profit organizations,
not interest groups, not an ethnic minority.
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of American culture is rich with social and ideological
movements of every sort, from the temperance and abolitionist efforts at the
outset of the nineteenth century to the animal rights and anti-abortion
campaigns at the close of the twentieth century. In recent decades, one of the
more influential movements in the United States has clearly been
multiculturalism. The multiculturalist project, though neither monolithic nor
immutable, can generally be identified by the objectives that it pursues as well
as the perspectives or premises that render it, at least for adherents, so morally
resonant and intellectually cogent. Broadly viewed, these objectives appear to
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Champagne, Elizabeth Dale, Mary Dudziak, Mark A. Graber, Elizabeth Staton Idleman,
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1. Tex Hall, The State of Indian Nations Today: Mapping a Course for the Next Seven
Generations, Address Before the National Congress of American Indians 2 (Jan. 31, 2003)
(underlining replaced by italics), available at http://www.ncai.org/form/docs/
SOIN_ADDRESS.pdf.
2. See Robert A. Goldberg, Grassroots Resistance: Social Movements in 20th Century
America (1996); Ideas, Ideologies and Social Movements: The United States Experience
Since 1800 (Peter A. Coclanis & Stuart W. Bruchey eds., 1999). Regarding the more extreme
movements throughout the nation's history, see John George & Laird Wilcox, American
Extremists (1996).
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be three-fold: to enhance public awareness and tolerance of the nation's
pluralistic character; 3 to increase the representative diversity of society's
economic, political, and educational institutions;4 and, eventually, to dislodge
the unicultural hegemony that has governed these institutions to date.
5
Correspondingly, these goals are often informed by several beliefs or
ideologies, such as cultural diversity, identity politics, the politics of
recognition, and cultural particularism, which themselves reflect convergent
conceptual premises regarding race, culture, and identity.
Much of the writing on multiculturalism has involved attempts either
to affirm or to repudiate its merit in toto. 6 The purpose of this Article is more
focused. In essence, it is to explain why American Indian tribes or tribal
members should be singularly hesitant to align themselves or their interests too
closely with the multiculturalism movement, regardless of its potential merit for
other groups or for society at large. The key to this thesis is the distinctive legal
and political status of Indians. Unlike other minorities or so-called outgroups,
Indian tribes-particularly those which are federally-recognized and comprised
of enrolled members-are politically separate, semi-sovereign entities.
Accordingly, unlike these other groups, what many Indian tribes fundamentally
seek-and what they uniquely stand to jeopardize-is the fortification and
recognition of their political separateness and, ultimately, their legal and
territorial sovereignty.
3. See, e.g., George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical
Perspective, 20 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 14 (1999) ("Today's political discourse often
involves the 'demand for recognition,' the demand to have one's culture and cultural identity
appreciated and respected. Minority groups and the 'politics of multiculturalism' often
generate this demand.") (footnote omitted); Johan D. Van der Vyver, Book Review, 17 Conn.
J. Int'l L. 323, 325 (2002) ("Multiculturalism recognizes in broad outline the fact of cultural
diversity within a political community (pluralism) as a salient fact that ought to be
accommodated in the political structures and legal arrangements of the state.").
4. See Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 1105, 1110 (observing that
diversity "appears as an aspect of the larger objective of 'multiculturalism[]'); see also
Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 85 (2000)
(discussing how "leaders of corporate America, its CEOs and board directors, are beginning to
learn how to use a diverse workforce to enhance productivity"); Symposium: Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, 54 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 1 (1998) (gathering articles
that discuss affirmative action in higher education).
5. See Jonathan Drimmer, Hate Property: A Substantive Limitation for America's
Cultural Property Laws, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 691, 726 (1998) (recognizing that multiculturalism
can be defined as seeking the pluralistic coexistence of equally-valued cultural systems).
6. See Ayelet Shachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 253,
253 (2001) ("The literature on multiculturalism has become a burgeoning industry.... The
bulk of this literature involves weighing the arguments for and against public policies that
would allow special provisions for protecting distinct cultures and ways of life.").
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At first blush, this thesis may seem at the very least counterintuitive, if
not somewhat outlandish.7 After all, Indians clearly possess characteristics that
place them within the ambit of multiculturalist concern: tribal membership has a
(non-white) racial or ethnic component; within certain segments of society,
there is latent or overt stereotyping of Indians along racial or ethnic lines; Indian
tribes since the colonial era have suffered economic, social, religious, and
political oppression, at times even genocide; and Indian tribal cultures, like
many minority cultures, are frequently at odds structurally, religiously, and
linguistically with traditional Western perspectives, often leading to significant
misunderstanding by dominant Western institutions. These, moreover, are only
the superficial similarities. Closer examination appears to reveal even deeper,
more salient points of conceptual or philosophical commonality, such as a
particularist (as opposed to universalist) view of culture and a separationist (as
opposed to assimilationist) view of cultural preservation. In short, the case for
Indian inclusion within the multiculturalism movement, or what can be called
the inclusionist position, would seem to be virtually unassailable.
Nevertheless, this Article will contend that neither these superficial
similarities nor these conceptual commonalities are truly as meaningful or
convergent as they first appear, and that they may not favor, much less compel,
the inclusionist position after all. With regard to the outward characteristics
such as racial identity and historic oppression, the inclusionist position is
problematic insofar as it suggests or presupposes that these are the defining
indicia of Indian tribalism vis-A-vis the dominant society-that, as with certain
other minority groups, there is nothing more, or at least nothing more important.
In fact, unique to Indian peoples is an identifiable and self-identifying political
or governmental dimension, rooted in history and ratified by law, which
7. It may also seem heretical if, as often appears to be the case, multiculturalism has
assumed the status of orthodoxy. But see id. at 256 (noting a "second wave" of literature
critiquing multiculturalism). To be sure, this author could find only one other scholar,
University of California, Los Angeles Professor Duane Champagne, who has directly
confronted the issue addressed in this Article. See Duane Champagne, Does the Focus in
Multiculturalism Emphasize Differences and Foster Racial/Ethnic Stereotypes?, in
Controversial Issues in Multiculturalism (Diane De Anda ed., 1997); Duane Champagne,
Does Multiculturalism Include American Indians? Native Resistance to a New Form of
Incorporation, Address Before the European Association of American Studies (Mar. 1996)
[hereinafter Native Resistance], quoted in part in Alan R. Velie, Indian Identity in the
Nineties, 23 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 189, 204 (1998). There have, however, been concerns
raised about the compatibility of multiculturalism with the interests of women. See, e.g.,
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999)
(presenting various perspectives); Walter Berns, Women: An Uncertain Fit for the
Multicultural Movement?, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 733 (1996) (noting that women are not
a cohesive group that fits easily into a multicultural model).
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categorically distinguishes them from any other minority interest on the
American landscape.
Likewise, with regard to the conceptual commonalities such as
particularism and separationism, the inclusionist position is mistaken to the
extent that these perspectives, when more carefully defined, are not understood
or interpreted the same way by Indians and multiculturalists. While the
particularism of the multiculturalists, for instance, generally rests on the view
that race and culture are socially constructed and historically contingent, the
particularism of Indian cultures frequently reflects a cosmologically-based view
that the various races and cultures are intrinsically, objectively, and
meaningfully different, and quite often that one's own tribe has in some manner
been divinely chosen and endowed with a special character, destiny, or purpose.
Similarly, while the separationism advocated by certain multiculturalists
typically rests on theories of individual and group autonomy or equality, the
separationism of Indian tribes is, by contrast, deeply rooted in historically
traceable and legally enforceable claims of geopolitical sovereignty.
Finally, this Article will contend that inclusion itself, even if it could
be theoretically supported, may actually prove injurious to the interests of tribal
Indians in the long term. In particular, tribal affiliation with the multiculturalism
movement may incrementally erode the very political and legal distinctiveness
upon which the self-identity and separate existence of tribes arguably depend.
While this distinctiveness does not alone preclude participation or inclusion in
the multiculturalism movement and may even be a unique contribution to it, the
unavoidable reality is that multiculturalism does not and cannot promise the
retention of tribal sovereignty in the long term. To the contrary, it may actually
undermine this sovereignty as it advances its own objectives. By focusing so
heavily on issues of race and equality, and by largely pursuing goals such as
integration and proportional representation, the multiculturalist agenda can only
serve to dilute or erode the Indian legal claim to political separateness,
especially given the historical fact that Indian law and federal Indian policy, for
better or worse, have often tracked progressive cultural movements and
understandings. Moreover, should multiculturalist concerns fall out of public
favor, as they already have to some extent, being tethered to the
multiculturalism movement may lead to a comparable decline in the acceptance,
if not the defensibility, of the continued special status of Indian tribes and tribal
Indians.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes in more detail the
phenomenon of multiculturalism, and in particular its premises,
conceptualization, and manifestations. Part III delineates the distinctive legal
and political status of tribes and their members. Combining these foundational
elements, Part IV then canvasses the ways in which, and extent to which,
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multiculturalism and Indian tribalism are either convergent or divergent. Part IV
also assesses these points of convergence or divergence by formulating three
models of multicultural-tribal relations (association, avoidance, and
appropriation) and by comparatively gauging the benefits and costs to tribal
Indians that each model would likely produce. Based on this assessment, this
Article concludes that multiculturalism and Indian tribalism are in significant
ways not compatible. And, if there is to be any association at all, it must be
selectively and strategically undertaken by tribes and their members based on
the long-term furtherance of sovereignty rather than the short-term attainment
of economic gain, political influence, or social status.8
II. THE ESSENTIAL CONTOURS OF MULTICULTURALISM
Multiculturalism, as intimated, does not readily lend itself to
definition. This is only slightly surprising, for it is not so much a singular or
comprehensive philosophy as it is a sociopolitical phenomenon resulting from
8. To some, this position may seem regressive and fundamentally insensitive to
decades of reform, while to others, it may appear as yet another instance of a non-Indian
commentator expostulating about what is good and what is bad for tribal Indians-yet another
manifestation of other- rather than self-determination. Accordingly, it may be helpful to offer
at the outset two qualifications that should lessen these concerns. First, nothing in this Article
is intended to suggest that tribal members should either refrain from full participation or be
denied full equality in the nation's political, economic, social, or educational processes and
institutions. It merely asks whether affiliation with the multiculturalism movement is an
appropriate and necessary undertaking, especially in light of the potential adverse
consequences that such affiliation might engender. Second, far from dictating to tribal Indians
what they should or should not do, this Article is intended simply to provide an alternative
perspective on multiculturalism-which is, after all, largely a non-Indian construct-so that
tribal Indians themselves may decide more circumspectly which course of action is most
desirable. Implicit in this approach, of course, is the view that some decision should be made,
and clearly this Article offers its own viewpoint. But the final assessment of short-term and
long-term costs and benefits, and thus the content and contours of that decision, belong rightly
and quite plainly with the tribes and tribal members themselves. There are, moreover, at least
two problems with attempts to speak on behalf of Indian tribal interests. The first is one of
legitimate authority, whether or not the speaker is a tribal member. See G. William Rice,
There and Back Again-An Indian Hobbit's Holiday "Indians Teaching Indian Law," 26
N.M. L. Rev. 169, 170 n.5 (1996). The second is one of overgeneralization, if only because
tribes, which number in the hundreds, obviously do not hold identical or monolithic views.
See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1137, 1230 n.435 (1990); Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable
Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native
Peoples, 19 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 11 n.17 (2000).
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the opportune convergence of several interests and ideologies. 9 In turn, any
attempt to define it must by necessity be descriptive, tentative, and illustrative,
rather than normative, conclusive, and exhaustive. The task of this first Part,
accordingly, is to delineate the contours of the multiculturalism movement-
descriptively, not definitively-by focusing on those goals or modes of action,
as well as those underlying conceptions or premises, that most often correspond
to efforts which are largely self-identified as multiculturalist in nature. This
delineation proceeds in two stages. Section A provides an intellectual or
conceptual overview of contemporary multiculturalism, while Section B
catalogs several of its actual manifestations within the legal, political, and social
arenas.
A. Conceptual Premises
The multiculturalism movement represents in many respects another
stage in the evolution of how civil equality, and thus the civil rights movement,
has been and ought to be conceptualized. In particular, its premises evince a
conceptual shift or departure from the traditional understanding of the nature
and meaning of discrimination and of the relationship of discrimination to the
structures and dynamics of society. Initially, and for many years, civil rights
efforts generally focused on objectively manifest forms of discrimination
against minorities, particularly black Americans.'0 These included legal
enactments that were textually or intentionally biased, and institutional
arrangements that vestigially, but clearly, reflected past deliberate
discrimination. Illustrative of such discrimination was the segregated state of
public education, initially by law and subsequently by the lingering effects of
this legally supported status quo.' 1
9. See Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 325 (noting that "[miulticulturalism comprises
a wide range of political theories"); Minn. Indep. Sch. Forum, What Is Multicultural
Education?, at http://www.misf.org/educatorstoolkit/mce/definitions.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2004) ("Many conceptualizations of multicultural education exist, since by its very nature it
embraces multiple points of view.").
10. See Robert C. Lieberman, Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining
Political Change, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 697, 705 (2002) (discussing the apparent original
scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
11. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (addressing
litigation originally challenging de jure segregation in a public school district and explaining
that government officials must eliminate the vestiges of such segregation as far as
practicable); Daniel J. McMullen & Irene Hirata McMullen, Stubborn Facts of History-The
Vestiges of Past Discrimination in School Desegregation Cases, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 75
(1993) (discussing the standards of Dowell).
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With time, as these manifestly discriminatory phenomena became
scarcer but as racial disparities persisted or even increased, the focus turned to
the notion of institutionally imbedded or structural racism-the idea that
seemingly neutral policies or practices, and even entire institutions or systems,
might be designed in ways that naturally and effectively (though perhaps
unintentionally) disadvantage certain groups.12 According to this view, racial
bias is not simply a phenomenon that correlates exclusively or even
predominantly with concretely malicious acts or their consequences, which,
under a traditional model, one then might present to the legal or political system
for redress. Rather, it can inhere in the very social structures, from language to
legal processes, that constitute the cultural and juridical baselines according to
which principles such as equality and fairness are discerned and measured.
1 3
12. See John Powell, Does Racism in Motion Have To Stay in Motion? Nonprofits as a
Force Against Structural Racism, 9 Race & Power (Summer 2002) (explaining that
"[p]ersistent racial disparities are not dependent upon racial animus or ill will" but instead are
'"structural' ... [i.e.,] built into all of our structures" and that "vastly different outcomes for
people of color and whites in housing, education, wealth, and treatment under the criminal
justice system are all examples of structural racism at work" insofar as "they are rooted in
laws and policies that disadvantage people of color and overadvantage whites"), available at
http://www.tsne.org/section/320.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); Dorothy E. Roberts, Why
Culture Matters to Law: The Difference Politics Makes, in Cultural Pluralism, Identity
Politics, and the Law 85, 89 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Cultural Pluralism] ("[T]he law promotes the dominant culture in much more subtle ways.
Those in power need not resort to obvious cultural bias because the law's language of
neutrality is already weighted in favor of the status quo."); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Structural
Racism and Trends in the Global Economy, in Int'l Council on Hum. Rts. Pol'y, Consultation
on Racism and Hum. Rts. 8, 9 (Dec. 3-4, 1999) ("[l]nstitutional or structural racism ... refers
to the dynamics of economic and social institutions through which racialised groups become
systematically marginalised or excluded from the benefits of development, regardless of the
prejudices, beliefs or intentions of particular individuals who happen to direct or manage such
institutions."), available at http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/52.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
13. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, Global Finance and the International Monetary
Fund's Neoliberal Agenda: The Threat to the Employment, Ethnic Identity, and Cultural
Pluralism of Latinalo Communities, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1547, 1549 (2000) (contending
that "the global monetary system, and the IMF in particular, systematically subordinates entire
nations of color" and that "[t]he same social relations, mechanisms, and patterns of thought
that keep down people of color throughout the world also serve to keep down millions of
people of all colors here in the United States"); Lodis Rhodes, The "Underclass" and
Structural Racism ("Problems in the inner city have roots in structural racism and economic
inequality.... Relationships between citizens and their communities, the governed, and the
governors are all conducted in systems rooted in structural racism. This system determines life
in the inner city ...."), at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/rhodesprp/0l02/divide/under.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004). For a recent example of this perspective applied to issues of
institutional gender equity, see Overview: The Status of Women Faculty at MIT (Mar. 2002),
available at http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/overview.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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This conceptual shift obviously has implications for how bias or
discrimination ought to be addressed. Section B, accordingly, will focus on how
these implications have been realized or manifested to date. For present
purposes, it is important to examine more thoroughly the shift itself. Of
particular significance is that this conceptual evolution has not transpired in a
theoretical or intellectual vacuum. Instead, largely correlating with the shift in
emphasis from surficial discrimination to structural bias have been certain
changes in the ways in which race, identity, and various cultural institutions are
themselves understood or interpreted. What follows is a summary of some of
the chief intellectual developments that have accompanied or contributed to this
shift, eventually culminating in socio-ideological phenomena such as
multiculturalism.14
Like all intellectual or philosophical movements, the roots of
multiculturalism (or at least its conceptual elements) can likely be traced back
hundreds if not thousands of years.15 At the risk of oversimplification, but in the
interest of economy, the present genealogy will be confined to the most
immediate and relevant developments. In particular, beginning in the latter half
of the twentieth century, and especially the last quarter, there emerged a
growing consensus within certain intellectual communities that traditional
Western narratives occupied an unjustifiably monopolistic or exclusive position
in many American institutions, especially those of a social, political, legal, and
educational nature. 16 The issue was not exclusivity per se, but rather
unjustifiable exclusivity (often termed hegemony) in light of extant alternative
narratives that to many observers appeared to possess comparable historical,
intellectual, or aesthetic qualities.'
7
14. For a comprehensive history, see Philip A. Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, The
Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (1999).
15. See Francis J. Mootz III, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in
American Legal Scholarship, 10 Yale J.L. & Human. 605, 637 n. 111 (1998) (book review)
(citing Joseph Margolis, Interpretation Radical but Not Unruly: The New Puzzle of the Arts
and History 1-2, 62-71 (1995)).
16. See Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Responding to the Demands ofDifference:
An Introduction, in Cultural Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1-2.
17. As noted by one author:
Multiculturalists address their work to those who have historically been
excluded from the historical narrative, while traditionalists seek a unified
coherent narrative that supports and explains American cultural ideology.
However, traditionalists fail to recognize that insistence on a unified
retelling of American history is ultimately hegemonic because the only
history that gets retold clearly and heroically is that of the winners, while
those of the losers gets forgotten.
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Complementing if not facilitating this emerging perspective was an
increasing sense, particularly in the precincts of higher education, that the
principal determinant of a narrative's relative status was not its intrinsic or
objective value as such-a concept which itself was coming under fire-but,
rather, the comparative social, economic, or political status of its proponents.
The prevailing modes of governance, aesthetics, historiography, morality, and
even language could not, in other words, be objectively or universally deemed
excellent, proper, or correct. Instead, their dominance appeared to be largely if
not entirely contingent upon the shared, often ethnocentric perspectives or
preferences of those in a position to accord them their elevated status.] 8
Furthermore, the content and parameters of any given favored narrative
appeared (far from coincidentally, from some perspectives) to preserve or
enhance the status and hence the power of its proponents. Not only, then, was
the favored narrative unduly elevated to its position of predominance, this
elevation and the maintenance of this predominance were arguably the means
by which the powerful remained in power. 19 Concomitantly, not only were
competing alternative narratives unjustifiably devalued and thereby
marginalized, this devaluation and the maintenance of this marginalization were
arguably the means by which the powerless remained out of power.20 So, for
example, it has been contended in regard to the univocality of academic law
that:
[T]he conventional methodology of traditional legal scholarship
maintains status quo values, and . . . it explicitly and implicitly
marginalizes, silences, and renders invisible the socialized Other
(e.g., blacks). In so doing, the Law's meaning and its discourse
presume the irrelevance of people of color generally and reinforce
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[genous] Americanus: The White Ethnic
Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1493, 1548 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Mary Romero, Historicizing and Symbolizing a Racial Ethnic Identity:
Lessons for Coalition Building with a Social Justice Agenda, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1599,
1602 (2000) (referencing "the Anglocentric and heteropatriarchal rule of the United States").
19. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 12, at 90 ("[T]he transparent cultural standard hidden
in the law got there as a result of social inequities, and it often works to privilege not only
white people's way of life but also their position of power.").
20. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social
Construction of the Black Self, 40 How. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1996) ("[T]he Critical Race Theory
Movement . . . developed an understanding that legal discourse and methodology are not
neutral and objective. Rather, [they] are stories, i.e., narratives. [Where] the Law's meaning is
a purposeful story, and its methodology (] a narrative that silently underwrites already existing
dominant norms and values .... ") (footnotes omitted); Power, Privilege and Law: A Civil
Rights Reader (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
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the subordination of blacks specifically. Conventional methodology
in traditional legal scholarship institutionalizes legal hegemony, a
concept that cannot be removed from the institutional practices
which rationalize employment discrimination, race hatred, gender
marginalization, and class oppression.
21
At the same time, a number of commentators contended that notions
like race and even gender and sexual orientation are to a significant extent
cultural constructs, and that certain institutions of society, such as legal rules
and norms, can effectively "reify[] racial identities ' '22 as well as notions of
gender,23 sexual orientation,24 and disability.25 According to one author, in fact,
21. Robinson, supra note 20, at 12-13. In addition,
American legal history teaches that socio-legal norms and narratives
weave the strands of culture, economics, politics, and society into a
recurrent pattern of racial violence: symbolic, spatial and textual. In the
high-profile criminal trials under scrutiny here, this pattern of violence is
marked by traditional figurations of racial identity, racialized narrative,
and race-conscious representation. Rooted in antebellum and postbellum
visions of racial status and community, the figures of black and white
identity, dominant and subordinate narrative, and color-conscious
representation pervade the law, lawyering, and ethics of criminal justice.
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 809,
812-13 (2000). For further discussion, with particular emphasis on judicial responses to
nontraditional legal scholarship, see Larry Cata Backer, Measuring the Penetration of
Outsider Scholarship into the Courts: Indifference, Hostility, Engagement, 33 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1173 (2000). For a critique of the more extreme strains of multiculturalism in legal
academia, see Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on
Truth in American Law (1997).
22. Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law (1987) (arguing that inequality precedes, rather than reflects, gender differences); David
B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 997 (2002) (examining how
different conceptions of disestablishment would have different effects on such issues at
governmental recognition of sex changes, sex-segregated education, and the mixed-sex
requirement for civil marriages).
24. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L.
Rev. 1467, 1473 n.16 (2000) (citing numerous sources for the proposition that homosexual
identity is not always easy to describe).
Rather than understanding sexual identities as a set of discrete and
independent social types, queer theorists emphasize their mutual
implication: for example, the word "homosexuality" first appears in
English in 1897, but the term "heterosexuality" is back-formed, first used
some years later. Heterosexuality comes into existence as a way of
understanding the nature of individuals after the homosexual has been
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"[i]t is now fairly widely accepted that race is a social construction."26 Thus,
from this perspective, "[r]ace is neither a skin color, nor a natural or biological
division of humankind. The concept of race is historically located, culturally
and socially specific, and therefore continually under construction in our own
time."2 7 In turn, "[o]nce race was understood as a social construction, scholars
identified different meanings and concepts attached to the term race itself.
Further scholarly work identified whiteness as a racial construction, protected as
a dominant norm by its ability to appear neutral and natural to white people. 28
Whether or not the substance of this or any of the foregoing
perspectives is demonstrably true or correct is not particularly necessary for
purposes of the Article. What is critical is that these perspectives comprise some
of multiculturalism's more conceptually central and commonly recognizable
components. More importantly, these perspectives, while not exhausting the
fullness of multiculturalism, are sufficient in and of themselves to illustrate just
how far-reaching and powerful the postmodernist, multiculturalist critique is or
can be. Not only do these various strands of thought, when taken together, call
into question the effects of society's institutions, norms, and premises, they also
call into question the functional legitimacy of these institutions, norms, and
premises. More than that, they undermine the very notion that such institutions,
diagnosed; homosexuality requires heterosexuality as its opposite,
despite its self-professed essentialism. Queer theorists point out that the
homo/hetero dichotomy, like many others in western intellectual history
that it arguably draws on and reinforces, is not only mutually implicated,
but also hierarchical (heterosexuality is superior, normal, and inevitable)
and masquerades as natural or descriptive.
Cressida Heyes, Identity Politics, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2002) (citation omitted), at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/
identity-politics/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
25. Heyes, supra note 24 ("The trope of social constructionism [argues] . . . that
disability is not a natural or objective flaw of certain individuals, but rather a set of challenges
faced by those whose needs the dominant culture fails to accommodate.") (citations omitted).
26. Carbado, supra note 24, at 1480 n.57.
27. Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker
v. City of Mesquite, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1309, 1320 (2000) (footnote omitted). For a somewhat
different conceptualization, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Critical Race Theory and
Autobiography: Can a Popular "Hybrid" Genre Reach Across the Racial Divide?, 18 Law &
Ineq. 419, 427 (2000) (book review) ("When race theorists assert that race is 'socially
constructed' they mean that race is an objective phenomenon (say having Black skin) that has
no positve or negative meaning until humans, and their social mores, history and laws,
provide that social meaning (as is encapsulated by White supremacist ideology).").
28. Mahoney, supra note 27, at 1320 (footnote omitted); see also Roberts, supra note
12, at 89.
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norms, and premises can ever be truly legitimate in an intrinsic or abstract
sense, apart from their concrete relation to presently or historically oppressed
groups. Disquieting as this perspective may be, however, it is hardly surprising.
Given the relativism that materializes without the certain prospect of
objectivity, the disbelief in neutrality that surfaces when normative society is
reduced to a superstructure of power relationships, and the subjective
individualism that arises when one's self or one's identity is conceived as
fundamentally an exogenous social construct, it is only natural that one might
simply discard the apparent pretense of discerning neutral and objectively fair
processes or criteria and, instead, gauge fairness exclusively in terms of the
demonstrable redistribution or restructuring of political power, social status,
material wealth, and moral authority.
B. Concrete Manifestations
To varying degrees, the multiculturalism movement does appear to
reflect or incorporate several of the premises and implications of this critique,
presumably indicating its likely resonance among those who possess or embrace
marginalized perspectives. 29 This incorporation, even if inadvertent, gives rise
to several consequences. Most prominently, because the legal and political
processes themselves can no longer be deemed neutral or reliable-imbedded as
they are with the self-preserving safeguards of those already in power-the
focus of civil rights achievements has turned almost exclusively to actual
results, whether in terms of equality of income or wealth, or percentage
representation in political office, corporate governance, or higher education.
Related efforts to locate neutral means by which equality may be achieved
(such as prohibitions on intentional discrimination) have largely been
overshadowed by efforts to locate explicitly non-neutral means (such as
minority-preferential selection systems) that will simply produce the desired
results. If there is, after all, no such thing as a neutral process, so that any
process will inevitably reflect the interests of those crafting it, then the solution
is necessarily to craft processes that reflect and will advance minority interests
outright.3 °
In recent years this strategy has manifested itself in a broad variety of
contexts ranging from academic assessment to capital punishment to voting. For
29. Cf Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67
Ind. L.J. 85, 91 n.33 (1991) (observing that "[i]t is ... only natural that groups long victimized
by injustice and only recently permitted a voice in legal discourse would be more critical of
the legal order").
30. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 92-93.
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example, the failure of certain minority groups to achieve equal performance on
standardized tests such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) has led some to
advocate abandonment of these tests altogether, 31 even though they appear to
provide a fairly objective tool for educational admissions and were, in part,
originally advanced precisely to minimize non-merit-based favoritism. 32
Likewise, minority overrepresentation on death row, in comparison to relevant
populations, 33 has prompted calls simply to eradicate capital punishment in toto
rather than continue efforts to make it procedurally fair,34 even though many of
the reform efforts to date have specifically been designed to minimize biased or
arbitrary decisionmaking. 35 Finally, when suboptimal but seemingly neutral
31. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Head of U. of California Seeks To End SAT Use in
Admissions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al (noting that the head of the University of
California criticized the use of SATs to rank students for admission, and recommended that
the University abandon its use). Similar proposals have been directed at professional-level
tests, such as the MCAT, the LSAT, and the bar examination. See Phillip Gonzalez & Betsy
Stoll, The Color of Medicine: Strategies for Increasing Diversity in the U.S. Physician
Workforce (Community Catalyst, Boston, Mass.), Apr. 2002, at 9 (suggesting that while the
MCAT has "some predictive value," it should be only one of many admissions criteria, and
"should not be used by itself for any purpose"), available at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/
health cast/uploadedfiles/TheColor of Medicine.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); Daria
Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 Mich. J. Race & L.
1, 10 (2001) ("Given the test's disproportionate impact, its limited predictive value and
questionable history, law schools should minimize, if not eliminate altogether, the LSAT's
role in the admissions process."); Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar
Exam, 52 J. Legal Educ. 446, 451 (2002) ("Even if the bar examination were a valid screening
device, one would have to ask whether its disproportionate impact on people of color could be
justified."). For an unapologetically radical critique of the legal profession's current
configuration, see George B. Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers Allowed: The
Inefficient Racism of the ABA's Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J. Legal Educ. 103 (2003).
32. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 965-66 (1996) (noting this original rationale with
regard to the SAT, but questioning its plausibility).
33. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death
Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 519, 522-24 (1995)
(reviewing various findings to this effect and concluding that "[t]he overall result is that the
most fundamental decisions that a society can make-who shall live and who shall die-are
racially biased"). For a more nuanced assessment of the data, see John C. McAdams, Racial
Disparity and the Death Penalty, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 153 (1998).
34. See, e.g., Michael B. Blankenship & Kristie R. Blevins, Inequalities in Capital
Punishment in Tennessee Based on Race: An Analytical Study ofAggravating and Mitigating
Factors in Death Penalty Cases, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 823, 858 (2001) (contending that total
eradication of the death penalty "is probably the best option because it is likely impossible to
eliminate all racial biases that currently exist within the capital sentencing process").
35. See Raymond J. Pascucci, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of
Fairness and Consistency, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1129, 1143 n.81 (1984) (noting that the
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voting methods in the 2000 presidential election, notably punch-card ballots,
appeared to create racially disproportionate voting errors and invalidations
(characterized by some as discrimination or disenfranchisement), 36 the short-
term solution proposed by several advocates was to conduct either a second
vote using an entirely different method or a manual recount using standards that
differed from those in place at the time of the original election, 37 even though
"[t]he reason we have machine counts is to guard against the risk of human
error and bias, '38 and the reason we employ uniform election standards and
single elections is to minimize unequal or discriminatory treatment.
This outcome-determinative strategy is perhaps most visible in the
areas of employment and education. Within the employment realm, for
example, the focus on prohibiting manifest discrimination has been superseded
by efforts to implement explicit preferences on the basis of race or other criteria
of diversity. According to one account:
As civil rights evolved so did the concept of affirmative action.
Originally, the term was utilized to express aggressive
nondiscrimination or a strong commitment to equality of opportunity
for all regardless of race or ethnicity . . . . As cynicism and
dissatisfaction grew despite the attainment of legal equality,
affirmative action took on a new meaning. Affirmative action would
represent any measures "beyond simple termination of a
discriminatory practice, adopted to correct or compensate for past or
present discrimination ...... This approach promotes special or
"procedural safeguards adopted after Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),] ... were
designed to reduce arbitrariness and caprice in capital sentencing decisions" though noting
that, despite these safeguards, "racial discrimination in the administration of capital
punishment continues").
36. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1046 (2001) (contending that there was "disenfranchisement
of black voters in Florida in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965"); Erin Chlopak,
Unequal Protection: Disenfranchisement in the 2000 United States Presidential Election, 8
Hum. Rts. Brief 34, 36 (2001) ("By disproportionately disqualifying votes legitimately cast by
African-Americans, the inconsistent use of punch-card ballot machines plainly discriminated
against black voters."); Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Jr., Minority Political
Participation in the New Millennium: The New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act, 79
N.C. L. Rev. 1215, 1244 (2001) (contending that "the disenfranchisement of minority voters
in all the minority racial groups was ubiquitous in the 2000 presidential election, with Florida
representing the most egregious case").
37. For an overview and jurisprudential analysis of this litigation, particularly the
tension among classical, modem, and postmodern conceptions of law, see Joel Edan
Friedlander, The Rule of Law at Century's End, 5 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 317 (2001).
38. Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613, 625 (2001).
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preferential consideration of defined or targeted groups that have
been the victims of discrimination. The goal of this type of
affirmative action represents a significant shift from equality of
opportunity to equality of outcome.
In the field of education, likewise, this strategy's influence has been
unmistakable. Among other developments have been curricular changes that
effectively dislodge traditional subjects or revise their traditional
understanding; 40 speech codes that restrict offensive or ostensibly intolerant
expression;41 a variety of diversity-preferential admissions and scholarship
efforts, particularly at the university level; 42 and, in the end, the production of
"equitable academic excellence (outcomes) for all students. ' ' 3
39. Jack P. DeSario, Thomas L. Colaluca & Gina A. Kuhlman, The Future of
Affirmative Action: The Legal Imperative Nationally and the Ohio Experience, 46 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 765, 768 (1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting Anthony Platt, The Rise and Fall of
Affirmative Action, 11 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 67, 72 (1997)).
40. See Minn. Indep. Sch. Forum, supra note 9 (quoting James A. Banks, An
Introduction to Multicultural Education 4 (1994)):
One of the goals of multicultural education is to acknowledge the
experiences and perspectives of oppressed groups that are commonly
excluded from mainstream academia (eg. [sic] racial, ethnic, class,
gender, etc.). To accomplish this, the traditional Western canon used in
shaping the curriculum must be reformulated and transformed to teach "a
more truthful, complex and diverse version of the West" in schools.
Given the premise that concepts such as history or language, previously understood as
relatively neutral or objective, are in fact constructs laden with the values and perceptions of
those in power, it is not surprising that there should be attempts to alter the content and
processes of education, from pre-school to the graduate and professional levels. See, e.g., Paul
Kengor, Evaluating World History Texts in Wisconsin Public High Schools (Wis. Pol'y
Research Inst. June 2002) (finding that several high school textbooks present distorted
renditions of history, especially so as to distort or diminish traditional Western values and
institutions), available at http://www.wpri.org/ReportsNolume l5/Vol 15no4.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Foundation for Individual Rights in Education-Free Speech, at
http://www.thefire.org/issues/speech.php3 (last visited June 6, 2003) (discussing, among other
things, campus speech codes). For a critical overview of such restrictions, see Vince Herron,
Note, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 407 (1994).
42. Several recent cases have addressed such efforts. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019
(2000); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
43. Minn. Indep. Sch. Forum, supra note 9 (quoting Sandra Dickerson, The Blind Men
(Women) and the Elephant: A Case for a Comprehensive Multicultural Education Program at
COLUMBIA HUMA N RIGHTS LA W REVIEW
In each of these contexts, the operative premise or implication is that
fairness or legitimacy is dictated not by the antecedent neutrality, consensual
nature, or intrinsic truth-potential of the process or institution itself, but rather
by the actual results or environment that the process or institution yields. As a
consequence, any result or environmental element may rightfully be eliminated
when inequality of status or outcome is perceived.44 This approach also
correlates strongly with the aforementioned perspective that inequality most
likely stems from the possession and exertion of power against the less
powerful, and that it does not result from "natural" or random inequality simply
manifesting itself through an otherwise neutral system. Under this perspective,
in other words, no system is neutral or objectively equitable; inequalities or
perceived offenses are not mere incidental effects of an otherwise valid or fair
system, but rather the logical consequence of inherently inequitable
arrangements or structurally biased institutions. There are, in short, no system
errors, only erroneous systems.
The adoption of this premise further correlates with another feature
distinctive of the multiculturalism movement, namely, the expansiveness of its
reach. Not only does the movement encompass traditional characteristics or
categories such as race and ethnicity, including innumerable variations on
each,45 it also encompasses several quite different characteristics or categories
such as (nonheterosexual) sexual orientation, (unconventional) religious beliefs
or belief systems, and (nonmainstream) lifestyles or family arrangements.46 The
the Cambridge Rindge and Latin School, in Freedom's Plow: Teaching in the Multicultural
Classroom 65, 70 (Theresa Perry & James W. Fraser eds. 1993)).
44. Consider in this regard the following definition of racial harassment from the
Oberlin College Student Handbook: "Racial harassment ... is behavior which calls attention
to racial identity of persons in a manner that prevents or impairs their full enjoyment of
education or occupational benefits or opportunities. What is often at issue is not
discrimination per se, but unconscious intimidation, coercion or abuse of power." 2002-2003
Oberlin College Student Handbook § V.F. 1, at 214, available at http://www.oberlin.edu/stlife/
handbook/02-03/OC St Handbook 2002_03.pdf. What is noteworthy is the emphasis on the
subjective psychological effects of one's behavior, rather than its objective content or one's
conscious motivation or intent.
45. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal
Science" of American Racial Thought, 10 La Raza L.J. 127 (1998) (describing the
marginalization of the Latino/a experience in racial discourse in the United States); Deborah
Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It 's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 957, 957 (1995) (rejecting traditional race-based affirmative action remedies in favor of
a "contextualized approach of 'multicultural empowerment' which would recognize race, but
only as one component of a much more complex notion of identity ... ").
46. See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1803, 1804
(2000) ("Cultural identity politics . . . informs at least some of the modem gay pride
movement, the push for recognition of the children of interracial couples as a distinct racial
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logic of this expansiveness, given the perspectives thus far examined, is fairly
simple to explain. If there are no uniquely objective or intrinsic qualities to race
or ethnicity (if it is a social construct), and if the issue is instead one of
institutionalized oppression (if it is a function of power possessed and exerted),
then the chief criterion for civil rights inclusion is essentially whether one has
been oppressed or at least perceives oppression. Thus, being of homosexual
orientation in many respects becomes as significant-and paradoxically as
insignificant-as having darker skin pigmentation or being of Hispanic
ancestry. Their equivalence stems from a common experience of construction
and subjugation by systemically biased social norms, processes, and
institutions. To be sure, multiculturalism is notable in this regard not merely for
its inciusiveness, but more fundamentally for its reluctance or inability to
openly distinguish among its constituents regarding the relative merits of their
claims.
Manifestations of contemporary multiculturalism are often
characterized as well by many of the classic indicia of ideological, even
extremist, thinking. These include, among other things, a belief that one's
objectives are both correct and compelling, that these objectives (because they
are correct and compelling) warrant compliance by legal or institutional
coercion, and that these coercive measures may justifiably be enforced against
most if not all of society's constituents. 7  First, the proponents of
multiculturalism seem generally to hold that the goals of their movement are not
simply beneficial or useful, but rather that they are compelling or overriding-
precisely the types of goals that could satisfy strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection or Free Speech Clause. So, for example, in the recent University of
Michigan admissions cases, the proponents of race-preferences argued that
obtaining the educational benefits of diversity is by itself a compelling
interest, 48 while in litigation against so-called hate speech codes, the codes'
defenders have typically argued that the government's interest in protecting the
victims from bigoted speech is likewise overriding.49
category, and the idea of a culture of the various disabilities such as the blind or the deaf.").
For one example, see Romero, supra note 18, at 1602 (alluding collectively to "African
American, Asian American, Native American, Feminist, Queer, and other OutCrit
subjectivities").
47. See George & Wilcox, supra note 2, ch. 2.
48. See Brief for Respondents at 21-32, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003)
(No. 02-241), available at 2003 WL 402237; Brief for Respondents at 14-33, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2003 WL 402236. The Supreme
Court agreed. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2426-47; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-41.
49. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 27-41, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377
(1992) (No. 90-7675), available at 1991 WL 530764.
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Second and related, multiculturalist initiatives are seldom presented to
their target entities or individuals as voluntary undertakings, one's fulfillment of
which would arise largely from the fora of conscience and reason. Rather, the
proponents of such initiatives usually endeavor to transform their platform into
institutionally or governmentally enforced mandates, compliance with which
then becomes a matter of legal or economic coercion. Examples of this second
phenomenon are not difficult to compile. Among the more common (some of
which have already been noted) are diversity-based preferences, 50 prohibitory
speech codes,5 1 various curricular requirements, 2 and mandatory diversity or
sensitivity training.53
Finally, just as multiculturalism has difficulty drawing internal limits
on the range of its constituents, it has similar difficulty discerning external
limits on the reach of its application. This expansiveness, too, is both
predictable and explicable. Not only does it follow from the view that one's
platform is correct and compelling, it also follows, perhaps more so, from the
rather global view that the structures and systems of society are pervasively and
genetically laden with the biases, preferences, and self-serving arrangements of
50. See, e.g., NCAA Const. art. II, § 2.7 ("The [National Collegiate Athletic]
Association shall promote diversity of representation within its various divisional governance
structures and substructures. Each divisional governing body must assure gender and ethnic
diversity among the membership of the bodies in the division's administrative structure.")
(emphasis added), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-ii-manualU
2002-03/2002-03_d2.pdf(last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
51. See The Betrayal of Free Expression on America's Campuses-A Sampling by the
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (surveying and rating several university speech
codes), available at http://www.thefire.org/offsite/data/washpostlll202.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2004).
52. See, e.g., Report of the Committee To Advance Our Common Purposes Curriculum
Task Force (May 2000) (recommending that "[e]ach [Rutgers University] college that grants
an undergraduate degree should require that students participate in educational experiences
that address multicultural understanding and intercultural interaction") (emphasis added),
available at http://diversityweb.rutgers.edu/taskforcereport.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Jonas Blank, Race Controversy Explodes, BLSA Makes Demands of
Administration, The Record, Mar. 20, 2003 (reporting that the Black Law Students'
Association of Harvard Law School, following certain racially offensive incidents, proposed
that all students, faculty, and administrators be required to attend sensitivity training),
available at http://www.hlrecord.org/news/320068.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004); Office of
Diversity and Equity of the University of Colorado at Boulder, Status of Women Report 2001-
2002: Strategic Action Plan Development, pt. E (recommending that the university, among
other things, "[c]reate and implement mandatory diversity training," "[r]equire attendance of
all campus faculty and staff," and "[i]ncorporate training into all campus orientations"),
available at http://www.colorado.edu/cu-diversity/statuswomen02/plan.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2004).
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the privileged and powerful. Thus, from a conceptual perspective, issues as
seemingly parochial or mundane as the location of a waste facility54 or the
words that describe a crayon's color 55 are no less suitable an object of
multicultural criticism and reform than matters of obvious importance, such as
the voting process in a national presidential election or the executive profile of a
transnational corporation. Being variant expressions of the same underlying
forces, all are potential media of systemic, structural discrimination or inequity,
though of course their practical or strategic significance may vary enormously.
There are no doubt additional aspects or manifestations of
multiculturalism that could be identified and addressed, but the foregoing
paragraphs clearly provide a reasonable and general rendition of the
phenomenon. More importantly, they will enable readers to assess, in Part IV,
the extent to which the multiculturalism movement coincides or conflicts with
Indian tribalism. Before undertaking such an assessment, it is necessary to
provide in Part III an equally broad rendition of the nature and parameters of
Indian tribal sovereignty.
III. THE DISTINCTIVE LEGAL STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES
The objective at this juncture is to delineate the unique status of tribes
and their members within the legal and constitutional framework of the United
States. As the following two sections will demonstrate, this status turns out to
be irreducibly political and sovereign in nature. In particular, it will be shown as
a matter of federal law that recognized tribes, especially those exercising the
full breadth of their inherent powers, are not simply voluntary associations or
joint property owners as such, nor are they merely self-segregating minority
groups who are defined, or who define themselves, predominantly by ethnicity
or race. Instead, they are fundamentally governmental bodies which possess
substantial jurisdiction over both their territory and their members.
A. Not Merely Associational or Proprietary
From the early colonial era onward, the European and then American
54. See, e.g., Michael K. Heiman, Waste Management and Risk Assessment:
Environmental Discrimination Through Regulation (rev. 1996), available at
http://www.ejnet.org/ej/wmra.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2003).
55. See Judy Muller, Color Corrections: Misplaced Sensitivity Prompts Some Bizarre
Changes, ABCNEWS.com Insite, Mar. 15, 1999 (editorializing on the decision by Crayola to
eliminate "Indian Red" because some users mistakenly believed that it referred to American
Indian skin color), at http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burmalarchives/199904/msgO0308.
html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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governing authorities, with various but limited exceptions, dealt with Indian
tribes in a distinctly bilateral fashion,56 recognizing at least formally the tribes'
original and extra-continental claims of both territorial integrity and sovereign
authority.57 Until 1871, in fact, relations between tribes and the United States
were frequently memorialized through the ratification of treaties or treaty-like
arrangements,58 a medium of relations ordinarily and traditionally reserved for
56. See William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1987) ("In colonial days, the British Crown and several of its colonies
dealt with the Indian tribes as wholly independent foreign nations.").
57. The Supreme Court has stated:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to
them, means "a people distinct from others."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). See also Timpanogos Tribe v.
Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002) ("By the time of the Revolutionary War, '[ilt
was accepted that Indian nations held 'aboriginal title' to lands they had inhabited from time
immemorial."') (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226,
233-34 (1985)); David E. Wilkins & K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American
Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law 7 (2001) ("When the United States was first established,
tribes were politically and militarily powerful and recognized as sovereigns through the treaty-
making process, among others."); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope:
Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 413, 437 (2002) ("Many treaties
explicitly recognize tribal governments as sovereign nations entitled to certain political rights,
including the right to self-government. Treaties also reflect the special place that the land
holds for the tribes, with provisions for exclusive possession of tribal lands and non-exclusive
use of off-reservation lands .... ") (footnote omitted). Likewise, "the historical record
adequately reflects that Indigenous peoples acknowledged and recognized the sovereignty of
the colonizing peoples." Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34
Ariz. St. L.J. 75, 79-80 (2002).
58. Nancy Carol Carter states:
The legal recognition of tribal sovereignty in United States law is
partially founded on the history of treaty-making. Upon declaring its
independence, the United States followed the tradition of the British and
other colonial powers in North America by entering into treaties with
Indian tribes. Indian treaties were negotiated and ratified in the same
manner as international treaties with foreign nations.
Nancy Carol Carter, American Indians and Law Libraries: Acknowledging the Third
Sovereign, 94 Law Libr. J. 7, 9-10 (2002) (footnote omitted). The United States government
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dealings among sovereign states or entities.5 9 Today, this course of dealings
continues to be characterized by both parties as a "government-to-government"
relationship, 60 set within a context defined by a federal policy of tribal self-
governance and tribal self-determination.6'
entered treaties with Indian tribes from the 1770s until 1871 when Congress statutorily ended
the practice. See Indian Appropriations Act, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (Mar. 3, 1871) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976)).
Although Congress began governing Indians by legislation, it is
important to note that the end of the treaty era did not end all consensual
relations between the government and Indian tribes, especially with
regard to land cessions. The executive negotiated agreements regarding
land cessions, which were then sent to both houses of Congress for
ratification.
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 200 n.23 (1984). On the arguable substantive insignificance of the 1871
Act, see David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples,
38 UCLA L. Rev. 759, 850-51 (1991).
59. See Zicherman v. Kor. Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (explaining that "a
treaty ratified by the United States is . .. an agreement among sovereign powers"). In
addition,
[u]nder principles of international law, the word [treaty] ordinarily refers
to an international agreement concluded between sovereigns, regardless
of the manner in which the agreement is brought into force. Under the
United States Constitution, of course, the word "treaty" has a far more
restrictive meaning. Article II, § 2, cl. 2, of that instrument provides that
the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur."
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1982) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted); see also
Porter, supra note 57, at 80:
[Firom the beginning and for many, many years thereafter, both the
Indigenous and colonizing peoples thought of themselves, and one
another, as peoples possessing and maintaining what is called
"sovereignty." ... While it might have been verbalized that one viewed
the other as not possessing the attributes associated with being sovereign,
actions betrayed such words. The treaties that were entered into reflected
both the acknowledgment of each peoples' sovereignty, as well as its
limits.
60. See, e.g., Exec. Mem., Government-to-Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994).
61. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian
Tribal Governments, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) ("The United States
recognizes the right of Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty and
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That Indian tribes and their members enjoy a special legal or political
status is not merely a fact to be inferred from this course of dealings, however,
for it is embodied in the organic law of the nation-the U.S. Constitution.
62
Most prominently, the Commerce Clause of Article I indicates that Indian tribes
are in some material sense comparable to foreign nations and the states, 63
though synonymous with neither,64 while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
recognizes (and excludes from apportionment) "Indians not taxed ' 65 and
implicitly references (and excludes) tribal Indians when securing citizenship to
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof . *,,66 In short, it is beyond question that "America's
indigenous nations occupy a distinctive political/legal status within the United
States as separate sovereigns, 67 one "which no other group, racial or otherwise,
can claim.,
68
self-determination."); Canby, supra note 56, at 1 & n.2 (citing similar policies of prior
administrations).
62. It is also embodied, to some extent, in various state constitutions. See, e.g., State v.
Shook, 67 P.3d 863, 866 (Mont. 2002) (noting that Article X, § 1(2) of "our own Constitution
makes a distinction regarding Indians"), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 67 (2003).
63. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes");
Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 5 ("The drafters of the Constitution, in express
wording in the commerce clause, recognized Indian nations as something distinct from the
United States.").
64. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-20 (1831) (explaining that
the Cherokee Nation is not a "foreign State" within the meaning of U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,
and that the tribes "may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
nations").
65. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed."); cf id art. I, § 2.
66. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see Williams, supra note 58, at 832
(explaining that "the legislative history indicates that the requirement that citizens be 'subject
to the jurisdiction' of the United States was designed primarily to exclude tribal Indians").
67. Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 8; see also United States v. Long, 324
F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The Supreme Court has long recognized that Indian tribes
occupy a unique place in the American system of government. ... Indian tribes are.., viewed
as quasi-independent or domestic dependent nations within the United States."); Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Federal courts have
long acknowledged that Indian nations possess a unique status in our constitutional order....
Indian tribes are distinct political entities retaining inherent powers to manage internal tribal
matters."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1041 (1996).
68. Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D.N.M. 1978), affTd, 601 F.2d 1110
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
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This distinctive status has in turn produced an entirely discrete body of
law, commonly known as federal Indian law,69 which occupies its own title in
the United States Code,70 is executed by its own array of administrative
agencies (most notably the Bureau of Indian Affairs),71 and is interpreted and
adjudicated within its own jurisprudential framework, including special canons
of construction 2 and customized rules of federal preemption.73 As one district
court has explained:
[R]egardless of whether there are factual similarities between the
treatment accorded Indian Tribes and African American slaves and their
descendants ..., there is nothing in the relationship between the United
States and any other persons, including African American slaves and
their descendants, that is legally comparable to the unique relationship
between the United States and Indian Tribes. Courts have recognized
fiduciary responsibilities running from the United States to Indian Tribes
because of specific treaty obligations and a network of statutes that by
their own terms impose specific duties on the government.
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Wilkins & Lomawaima,
supra note 57, at 40 ("No other racial/ethnic group in America signed treaties with the federal
government; hence American Indians have a unique political status in this country that
distinguishes them from other 'minority' groups."); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and
Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 861, 894 (2000) ("American Indians are
the only ethnic group recognized by American law as having their own governments ....");
Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 Vt. L. Rev.
7, 8 (1996) ("Indian tribes are the only minority within the United States with their own
government ... ").
69. This designation, including the perspectives that inform it and manner in which it is
rendered, has not gone uncriticized. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the
Hanodaganyas To Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 899
(1998) (calling it "federal Indian control law"); Robert A. Williams, Jr., "'The People of the
States Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies ": The Indian Side of the
Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 981 (1996) (calling it "the White
Man's Indian Law"). In all events, federal Indian law ought not to be confused with tribal law
or custom. As one author has noted, "there is a sharp distinction between United States federal
law as applied to Native Americans and the tribal law that emanates from hundreds of
sovereign Indian tribes." Carter, supra note 58, at 8.
70. Title 25 of the United States Code, labeled "Indians," encompasses most of the
federal statutes governing Indian affairs, several of which, in turn, are enforced through Title
25 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
71. Other Indian-related agencies include the Indian Health Services in the Department
of Health and Human Services, the Office of Tribal Justice in the Department of Justice, and
the Office of Native American Programs in the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
72. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985);
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690
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Because of th[e] historical relationship between the United States
and American Indians a substantial amount of legislation has
developed which is unique to Indians and Indian tribes. Such
legislation generally distinguishes Native Americans from other
Americans for purposes of application of particular rules, because
the United States government has determined that American Indians
have unique historical standing which places them outside certain
legislative schemes applicable to other United States citizens.
74
According to this court, in fact, it is rather clear from this unique legal
constellation that "Indian legislation dissimilates, rather than assimilates" 75-an
observation that will obviously have implications for the later analysis of
whether the objectives and premises of multiculturalism coincide or conflict
with the status and interests of tribal Indians.
For present purposes, the most significant consequence of this legal-
historical backdrop is the dual reality that Indian tribe, rather than being merely
an ethnic classification, is predominantly a geopolitical designation, 76 while
(1979); Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); DeCoteau v. Dist. Court,
420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111,
116 (1938); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10
(1899).
73. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1980);
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Oregon, 143 F.3d 481, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1998).
74. Perkins v. Lake County Dep't of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1275-76 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Also, see Exec. Order No. 13,175, supra note 61,
at 67,249:
The United States has a unique legal relationship with Indian tribal
governments as set forth in the Constitution of the United States, treaties,
statutes, Executive Orders, and court decisions. Since the formation of
the Union, the United States has recognized Indian tribes as domestic
dependent nations under its protection. The Federal Government has
enacted numerous statutes and promulgated numerous regulations that
establish and define a trust relationship with Indian tribes.
Accordingly, "[t]ribal rights are based in the doctrine of inherent sovereignty, affirmed in
hundreds of ratified treaties and agreements, acknowledged in the commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution, and recognized in ample federal legislation and case law." Wilkins &
Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 8-9.
75. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1276.
76. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (2004) (defining "Indian tribe" as "any tribe, band, or
other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as
possessing powers of self-government"); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323
(1978) ("Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory."); Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F.
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Indian, rather than being exclusively a term of minority group membership, is
principally a term of political affiliation.77 Thus, under current law, an Indian
Supp. 2d 742, 746 (N.D. Ind. 2000) ("For purposes of acknowledgment and dealings with the
federal government, a tribe is a political institution, so racial or ancestral commonality isn't
enough, without a continuously existing political entity, to constitute a tribe for these
purposes.") (citations omitted), affd, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1129 (2002); LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Wis. 2001) ("[T]he
underlying principle of American Indian law is that Indian tribes are sovereign political
entities.").
Recognized tribes are acknowledged as self-governing entities standing
in a government-to-government relationship with the United States. Each
tribal-federal relationship is unique, being defined by a specific history
and the treaties, agreements, legislation, and executive actions applicable
to the tribe. The status of recognized tribes under United States law
derives from this political association, not from a racial distinction based
on the Indian blood of tribal members.
Carter, supra note 58, at 11 (footnote omitted). For a hybrid racial-political definition, see
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) ("By a 'tribe' we understand a body of
Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or
government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory .... ").
77. See LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304-06 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that,
for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, even tribal membership is not sufficient if the
tribe itself is not federally recognized); United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that a member of a tribe which is no longer federally recognized
"anthropologically ... remains an Indian," but that "his unique status vis-A-vis the Federal
Government no longer exists"); State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 652-55 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that a criminal defendant, racially an Indian but not tribally enrolled, was not an
"Indian" for jurisdictional purposes). Thus, "Indian" in the United States Code is
overwhelmingly defined in terms of tribal membership or jurisdictional geography, and not
simply in terms of ethnicity. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 450b(d) ("a person who is a member of an
Indian tribe"), 1301(4) ("any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States as an Indian under section 1153 of Title 18 if that person were to commit an offense
listed in that section in Indian country to which that section applies"), 1452(b) ("any person
who is a member of any Indian tribe, band, group, pueblo, or community which is recognized
by the Federal Government as eligible for services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs"),
1603(c) ("any person who is a member of an Indian tribe"; though noting alternative
definitions), 1801(a)(1) ("a person who is a member of an Indian tribe"), 1903(3) ("any person
who is a member of an Indian tribe"), 2201(2) ("any person who is a member of any Indian
tribe or is eligible to become a member of any Indian tribe, or any person who has been found
to meet the definition of 'Indian' under a provision of Federal law if the Secretary determines"
that it is consistent with the purposes of the statute), 1303(9) ("a member of an Indian tribe"),
3703(8) ("an individual who is a member of an Indian tribe"), 4103(9) ("any person who is a
member of an Indian tribe") (2004). But,
[tihe term "Indian" as used in [25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479] shall include all
persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants
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tribe strictly speaking is a federally-recognized political entity possessing a
variety of inherent and delegated powers, especially those relating to self-
government,78 and often occupying a jurisdictionally distinct area of land that to
some degree functions extraterritorially to the one or more states in which it is
situated.79 As the en banc Tenth Circuit has recognized: "Indian tribes are
neither states, nor part of the federal government, nor subdivisions of either.
Rather, they are sovereign political entities possessed of sovereign authority not
derived from the United States, which they predate." 80 What this means in terms
of descriptive legal categories is that Indian tribes are manifestly governmental
and meaningfully sovereign, rather then merely associational or propriety, in
nature. They are, in the Supreme Court's words, "a good deal more than
'private voluntary organizations.' 8
of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other
persons of one-half or more Indian blood.
Id. § 479.
78. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status."); United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924, 927 (D. Or. 1979) ("Generally
speaking, an Indian tribe possesses all the powers of a sovereign state, including the powers of
internal governance over relationships between tribal members.").
79. See Miami Nation, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (explaining that a federally recognized
tribe possesses "inherent sovereign authority independent of the United States and
independent of the state in which it is located"); Mulkins v. Snow, 133 N.E. 123, 124 (N.Y.
1921) (describing an Indian reservation as "quasi extraterritorial"); Helgemo v. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, No. 01-2611-BA, 644 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Wis. 2002) ("Although Indian tribal courts
may be located within the geographic or geopolitical boundaries of a state, they are not state
courts; they are courts of separate sovereign nations."); Williams, supra note 58, at 762
("From the beginning of Indian/non-Indian relations in this country, tribal jurisdictions have
existed as islands where the law of the United States and of the various states does not fully
apply."). In reality,
[t]he term "tribe" has a dual meaning-it refers both to the
ethnologically defined group (a contested definition even among
anthropologists) and the legally recognized political entity. . . . [Bly
invoking the ethnological term, the law suggests that "tribe" has a
natural, prelegal meaning apart from that decreed by federal statutes or
treaties.
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on
Indian Group Life, 28 Law & Soc'y Rev. 1123, 1127 (1994) (citation omitted).
80. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(footnote omitted).
81. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975)). At the same time, precisely because of their governmental status, "[t]ribe[s] may not
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Precisely because of their sovereign status, recognized tribes ordinarily
possess the power "to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce
those laws by criminal sanctions" ;82 ,"to determine tribe membership; to regulate
domestic relations among tribe members; and to prescribe rules for the
inheritance of property"; 83 "to control the use of [their] natural resources"; 84 to
litigate as parens patriae on behalf of their members;85 to invoke sovereign
immunity against lawsuits to which they have not consented or which Congress
by abrogation has not authorized; 86 and to exercise all other "aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status." 87 Moreover, because tribes in large part
sue under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 to vindicate the[ir] sovereign right[s] .... " Inyo County, Cal. v.
Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 123 S. Ct. 1887, 1894
(2003).
82. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322. Also,
While tribal sovereignty has limitations under American law, tribes
function as governmental entities with political and legal jurisdiction
over their lands and, in most instances, the persons who inhabit those
lands. Tribes retain the authority within their jurisdictional bounds to
enact and enforce laws, to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations, and to adjudicate through courts or traditional means. In the
exercise of these powers of self-government, tribes create primary law.
Carter, supra note 58, at 10.
83. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 n. 18 (citations omitted).
84. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1041 (1996).
85. See Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.
Supp. 1319, 1327 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (finding that tribes have the right to parens patriae,
though only if they represent all members); Cami Fraser, Note, Protecting Native Americans:
The Tribe as Parens Patriae, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 665 (2000) (arguing that tribes have
parens patriae standing even where they only represent some members).
86. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-55 (1998); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237,
1241-45 (11th Cir. 1999); Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical and Normative Reflections on a
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 Tulsa L.J. 661 (2002).
87. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe. Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely
alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. They cannot enter into
direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations.
And... they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.
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exercise inherent power, independent of the federal and state governments, their
actions are not directly subject to constitutional limitations 88 and their criminal
prosecutions, even if duplicated by state or federal prosecutions, generally will
not bear upon the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.
89
Importantly, this sovereign and governmental understanding of tribes
pervades federal Indian law-from recognition to termination-and essentially
defines the tribal-federal relationship. 90 So, for example, under the current
Id. at 326 (citations omitted).
88. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 ("As separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations of federal or state authority.") (citing Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)); Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880-81 ("Because tribal powers of
self-government are 'retained' and predate the federal Constitution, those constitutional
limitations ... do not apply to tribal institutions exercising powers of self-government with
respect to members of the tribe or others within the tribe's jurisdiction."); Chapoose v. Hodel,
831 F.2d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1987) ("'Indian tribes are not states of the union within the
meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional limitations on states do not apply to
tribes."') (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 664-65 (rev. ed. 1982));
Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in
American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 287, 307-08 (1998) ("The U.S.
Constitution regulates federal and state behavior towards tribes, but the tribes, being
sovereign, are not bound by it. Consequently, . . . tribal members cannot sue tribal
governments for violating the U.S. Bill of Rights."). Due partly to this fact, Congress in 1968
passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (2004), which applies
statutory versions of several constitutional guarantees to the actions of tribal governments. See
id. § 1302; Poodry, 85 F.3d at 881-84 (discussing the content and legislative history of the
ICRA). Regarding the construction of these guarantees, see Mark D. Rosen, Multiple
Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 479 (2000).
89. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-32; United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475, 478 (7th
Cir. 2003) ("Prosecutions by Indian tribes and the federal government are prosecutions by
separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."). This general rule will
presumably not apply, however, where a tribe's criminal jurisdiction is congressionally
delegated rather than inherent.
[I]f a tribe's power to prosecute derives from inherent sovereignty, then a
subsequent federal prosecution is permissible .... If, on the other hand,
tribal jurisdiction derives from a congressional grant of power, the dual
sovereignty doctrine is not applicable and a subsequent federal
prosecution may implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
90. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at 1125 (explaining that, "[f]or many
purposes, the tribe has been the basic unit of federal Indian law" and that, "[a]ccording to the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, . . . the 'tribe' is the unit that possesses governmental
powers over a reservation").
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requirements for federal recognition, a petitioning tribe must demonstrate not
merely that it "has been identified as an American Indian entity on a
substantially continuous basis since 1900,"'91 but that it "has existed as a
community '92 and "has maintained political influence or authority over its
members as an autonomous entity from historical times until the present. '93 In
turn, such recognition not only functions as "a prerequisite to the protection,
services, and benefits of the Federal government available to Indian tribes by
virtue of their status as tribes, ' 94 but also, and more fundamentally, "entitle[s]
[tribes] to the immunities and privileges available to other federally
acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their government-to-government
relationship with the United States as well as the responsibilities, powers,
limitations and obligations of such tribes." 95
For many of the same reasons, the meaning or status of Indian is
likewise political in nature. 96 From a legal standpoint, an Indian strictly
91. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (2004).
92. Id. § 83.7(b).
93. Id. § 83.7(c) (emphasis added). An official list of federally recognized tribes can be
found at 62 Fed. Reg. 55,270 (Oct. 23, 1997), while an unofficial list of non-federally
recognized tribes can be found at http://www.kstrom.net/isk/maps/tribesnonrec.html (last
visited Apr. 14, 2004). It should be noted that prior to the regulations in 25 C.F.R. pt. 83, "the
federal government had previously recognized groups of Indians as tribes in a variety of ways
for a variety of purposes" and that "[e]ven after the promulgation of Part 83, 'tribes cannot be
neatly divided into "recognized" and "nonrecognized" tribes for all purposes; rather, a tribe
may 'exist' for some purposes but not for others."' Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d
1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Cohen, supra note 88, at 3-7).
94. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2004).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
Federal acknowledgment establishes an intergovernmental relationship
between the United States and the acknowledged tribe. An
acknowledged tribe becomes a domestic dependent nation with inherent
sovereign authority independent of the United States and independent of
the state in which it is located. An acknowledged tribe may exercise
jurisdiction over its territory and establish tribal courts than can assert
criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-Indians, and gains
considerable other discretionary authority under federal law.
Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745-46 (N.D. Ind. 2000)(citations omitted), aff'd, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002).
The recognition regulations and their implementation have not been without critics. See, e.g.,
Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 Stan. L. &
Pol'y Rev. 271 (2001).
96. Correspondingly, discrimination or bias on the basis of Indian, particularly tribal,
status might more properly be seen as xenophobia or national origin discrimination rather than
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speaking is not simply an ethnic Native American, but ordinarily refers to an
enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe who is thereby vested with all
the legal and political rights and obligations commonly associated with
citizenship, subject to tribe-specific variations in tribal law.97 These frequently
include: the right to vote in tribal elections,98 the ability to run for tribal office, 99
racial or ethnic discrimination. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the
Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship
Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 107, 158 (1999).
97. Enrollment is not the only means to establish membership in a tribal political entity,
but it is the most observed method. See United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir.
1996) ("While tribal enrollment is one means of establishing status as an 'Indian' under 18
U.S.C. § 1152, it is not the sole means of proving such status."); Margo S. Brownell, Note,
Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal Indian
Law, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 275, 305 (Fall 2000/Winter 2001) ("Most tribes define tribal
membership requirements in a tribal constitution and implement the definition through a tribal
roll."). Moreover, while it is true that tribes themselves typically require a demonstration of
tribal ancestry, usually framed as a minimum blood quantum such as one-quarter or one-
eighth, see infra note 139, there is no general federal law mandating such a requirement.
98. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Mont. Const. art.
VIII, § 1 ("Any member of the Blackfeet Tribe, eighteen (18) years of age or over, shall be
eligible to vote at any election. ... ), at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
blackfeetconstandbylaws.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Const.
art. V, § 1 ("All enrolled members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 18 years of age or
over, who have maintained legal residence on the reservation for a period of ninety (90) days
immediately prior to any election shall have the right to vote."), at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/cheyenne-siouxconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Const. art. VII, § 3(a) ("Any member duly enrolled in
the Grand Traverse Band who is at least eighteen (18) years old, has been a resident for a
period of at least six (6) months .... and is registered to vote on the date of any given tribal
election shall be eligible to vote in that tribal election.") at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.
org/ccfolder/grand traverse const.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians of N.D. Const. art. V, § 2(a) ("Any enrolled member of the tribe, eighteen
(18) years of age or over shall be entitled to vote in any election provided he has resided in
Rolette County a period of thirty (30) days immediately prior to a given election."), at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/turtle mountainconstandbylaws.htm (last visit-
ed Apr. 6, 2004); Yavapai-Apache Nation Const. art. VIII, § 8 ("All tribal members who are
eighteen (18) years of age or older on the date of any tribal election shall be eligible to vote in
the election."), at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/yavapaiapache-const.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
99. See, e.g., Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Const. art. V, § 3 ("Any member of the tribe
may become a candidate for any office upon the signed petition of at least ten (10) legal voters
from the district where he is declared to be a legal resident."), at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/cheyenne_sioux_const.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Const. art. VII, § 4(a) (requiring tribal membership for
tribal chair or tribal council candidates), at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
grand traverse const.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Minn. Chippewa Tribe Const. art. IV, §
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the right to utilize the tribal court system, 00 the rights to assemble and to
petition the tribal government,' 0' and the right to partake in various tribal
resources. 0 2 Concomitantly, tribal members must abide by whatever conditions
are attached to tribal membership 10 3 and may be subject to the criminal laws and
2 (revised) ("A candidate for Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Committeeman must be an
enrolled member of the Tribe and reside on the reservation of his enrollment."), at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/chippewa-constandbylaws.htm (last visited Apr.
6, 2004); Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Const. art. IV, § 2 ("Any
qualified member of the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin
may announce his or her candidacy or be nominated for the [Tribal] Council."), at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/red_cliffconstandbylaws.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2004).
100. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation of Okla. Const. art. I, § 1 ("The judicial process of the
Cherokee Nation shall be open to every member of the Cherokee Nation."), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/cherokeeconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
101. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation Const. art. IV, § 5 ("The citizens shall have the right,
in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those
invested with powers of government; for redress of grievances or other purposes, by address,
or remonstrance."), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/chickasaw_
const.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. Const. art. LX
(providing for participatory governance), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/kickapooconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). For additional references, see Elmer
R. Rusco, Civil Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law: A Survey of Civil Rights Provisions
in Tribal Constitutions, 14 Am. Indian L. Rev. 269, 275-76 (1990).
102. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Umpqua & Siuslaw Indians Const. art.
IV, § 1 (recognizing "[t]he right to equal opportunity to participate in the [tribe's] economic
resources and activities . . ."), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
coos umpquasiuslawconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Confederated Tribes of Warm
Springs Reservation of Or. Const. art. VII, § 1 ("All members of the Confederated Tribes shall
be accorded equal opportunities to participate in the economic resources and activities of the
Reservation."), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/warmsprings_
constandbylaws.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Coquille Indian Tribe Const. art. VIII, § 1
("All members of the Coquille Indian Tribe shall be accorded the opportunity to participate in
the economic resources and activities of the Tribe."), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/coquilleconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Ely Shoshone Tribe Const.
art. VIII, § 1 ("All members of the Ely Shoshone Tribe shall have equal rights, equal
protection ... and equal opportunity to participate in the economic resources, tribal assets and
activities of the tribe."), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
elyshoshoneconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians Const. art. X, § 2 ("Members.. . shall have the right to fish, hunt, trap and
gather food from plants, subject to reasonable restrictions ... ; provided that this Section does
not include the right to commercially develop tribal resources, such right being reserved to the
Band.... ."), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/grandtraverse_
const.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
103. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686 (1990) (recognizing "[t]he power of a tribe to
prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for its own members"), superseded on other grounds
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW
the jurisdiction of their tribe,1°4 if not also those of other federally recognized
tribes.1 °5
B. Not Merely Racial or Ethnic
The most striking application of these principles, especially with
regard to multiculturalism, is arguably found in the jurisprudence of equal
protection. 106 Arising from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 0 7 the equal
protection guarantee largely prohibits racial and ethnic classifications by the
government, subjecting them when challenged to rigorous judicial review, or
what is often called strict scrutiny. Accordingly, a government's differential
treatment of citizens by race or ethnicity, in order to satisfy the guarantee of
equal protection, must be narrowly tailored or necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.!
0 8
Were "Indian" nothing more than a racial or ancestral category, the
government's selective use of that category would thus be subject to, and would
thus have to satisfy, this heightened level of constitutional review.0 9 The
by Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301
(2004)).
104. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
105. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2004) (recognizing "the inherent power of Indian tribes..
to exercise jurisdiction over all Indians") (emphasis added), abrogating Duro, 495 U.S. at
688 (holding that tribal criminal jurisdiction extends only to tribal members). The validity of
this congressional recognition of inherent tribal power, contra Duro, was recently upheld in
United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).
106. See Carole Goldberg, A Law of Their Own: Native Challenges to American Law, 25
Law & Soc. Inquiry 263, 265 (2000) (book review) (explaining that "[the] contrast between
Native American legal status and the position of other racial or ethnic groups became sharply
evident in the early Supreme Court decisions addressing affirmative action").
107. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting each state from "deny[ing] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499-500 (1954) (reading a comparable guarantee into the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause, which binds the federal government).
108. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[A]lI racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.").
109. See Williams, supra note 58, at 764 (If Title 25 used the word "'African-American'
everywhere that it used the word 'Indian,' the Court would [] waste little time in striking
down the whole volume .... [T]he special status of the Indians would have to come to an
end, unless there was some extraordinary state interest."); Kimberly A. Costello, Note, Rice v.
Cayetano: Trouble in Paradise for Native Americans Claiming Special Relationship Status,
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judiciary has held quite clearly, however, that the differential treatment of
Indian tribes and their members is ordinarily not a form of racial or ethnic
classification subject to strict scrutiny,' 10 at least when employed by the federal
government,"' and therefore need only "be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
79 N.C. L. Rev. 812, 817 (2001) ("The classification of the special relationship [betweei the
federal government and Indian tribes] as legal and political is crucial; were the relationship
based on a racial distinction, the differential treatment would have to withstand the heightened
standard of strict scrutiny to survive a constitutional challenge.").
110. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974); United States v. Aanerud,
893 F.2d 956, 960-62 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 (1990).
[B]ecause federal regulation of Indian tribes is "rooted in the unique
status of Indians as 'a separate people' with their own political
institutions," the Supreme Court has long distinguished Indian
classifications from suspect racial classifications, holding that '"the
unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal
Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation
that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive."
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 158 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977), and Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979)
(quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52)). The notion that the differential treatment of Indians
does not amount to ordinary racial discrimination is not an invention of the Mancari Court. As
explained in politically incorrect terms:
The Indian law is not to be confused with the rules of racial segregation
and discrimination ... as against Negroes and Mongolians in several
American states and which have occasionally included Indians; for...
[t]he Indians' legal position is due more to their independence of, than to
their economic or political inferiority to, the ruling race.
See, e.g., William G. Rice, Jr., The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United
States, 16 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l L. 78, 78 (1934).
Ill. In general, courts have been less solicitious of state or local laws employing Indian
or Native American classifications. See, e.g., Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp.
2d 927, 938-42 (D. Alaska 1999), aff'd, 335 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003); Tafoya v. City of
Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527, 1530-31 (D.N.M. 1990); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as
Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection
Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1432 (1995) (noting and explaining the differential
standards of scrutiny). According to one court,
[a local government] does not enjoy the same special relationship with
and power to regulate Indian tribes that the federal government has ....
Absent . . . a showing [that their actions are rationally tied to the
fulfillment of the federal government's obligation to Indians], local
[governments] are simply not free to discriminate between Indians and
non-Indians based solely on their status.
Meyers v. Bd. of Educ., 905 F. Supp. 1544, 1570-71 (D. Utah 1995). Further,
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Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians" and "rationally designed to
further Indian self-government .... 12 According to the Supreme Court, such a
classification "is not even a 'racial' preference"11 3 but rather a "political"
classification 114 that falls within "the Federal Government's broad authority to
Mancari held only that when Congress acts to fulfill its unique trust
responsibilities toward Indian tribes, such legislation is not based on a
suspect classification. Indeed, in its more recent case of Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), the Supreme Court expressly stated that
the Mancari "opinion was careful to note ... that the case was confined
to the authority of the BIA, an agency described as 'sui generis."'
Malabed, 335 F.3d at 868 n.5 (citation omitted) (quoting Rice, 528 U.S. at 520).
112. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. This does not mean, of course, that the differential
treatment of Indians or Native Americans by private entities in the employment, public
accommodations, or property contexts cannot constitute actionable discrimination. Indeed, it
can. See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154
F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1998) (treating discrimination on the basis of tribal affiliation as
national origin discrimination under Title VII), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1098 (2000); Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wis., Inc., 41 F.3d
1190, 1193-94 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the harassment of Indians in the exercise of
treaty-based fishing rights violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994)), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1096
(1995).
113. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553. For criticism, see Granite Valley Ltd. P'ship v. Jackpot
Junction Bingo & Casino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (Randall, J.,
concurring) (contending that Mancari "attempts to sidestep the bitter truth that Indian
sovereignty is a race-based classification").
114. In Mancari, the Court noted that the challenged preference "is not directed towards
a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally
recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified
as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature." Mancari,
417 U.S. at 553 n.24. Accord Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646 ("[Fjederal regulation of Indian
affairs... is rooted in the unique status of Indians as 'a separate people' with their own
political institutions . . . [and] therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political
communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a 'racial' group .... ) (quoting Mancari,
417 U.S. at 553); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214-16
(5th Cir. 1991) (upholding a peyote exemption for members of the Native American Church
because the church "is limited to Native American members of federally recognized tribes
who have at least 25% Native American ancestry, and therefore represents a political
classification" and because the exemption "is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of preserving Native American culture"); Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781
F.2d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1986) ("No compelling state interest need be shown since preferential
treatment for tribal members is not a racial classification, but a political one."); State v.
McBride, 955 P.2d 133, 138 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) ("Federal law promoting tribal self-
government and Native American welfare is not... premised on racial distinctiveness; rather,
such laws are based upon the political relationship existing between tribal and federal
governments which predates the United States Constitution.").
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legislate with respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens
or benefits."''
1 5
But there is a catch. To qualify for this designation, the classifying
regulation cannot be entirely detached from the political or sovereign status of
tribes but instead must "relate[] to Indian land, tribal status, self-government or
culture ... because 'such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as
"a separate people" with their own political institutions."" 16 It is only when
Indians are treated differently apart from their tribal status, or when "Indian" or
"Native American" is used for classification without regard to tribal
membership, that governmental classifications appear fundamentally racial or
ethnic in character and thereby become vulnerable to the rigors of strict
scrutiny.' '
7
115. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990), superseded on other grounds by Pub. L.
No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2004)). "The
inclusion of the word 'enrolled' suggests that perhaps this power of Congress does not extend
to unenrolled Indians, however defined by Congress." Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup
Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over Non-Member Indians: An
Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v.
Reina, 38 Fed. B. News & J. 70, 72 (Mar. 1991). See also John Robert Renner, The Indian
Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations on the Federal Power Over Indian
Affairs, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 129, 156 (1992) (perceiving in the case law, for purposes of
equal protection and congressional power, a difference between "an ethnic Indian who is not
an enrolled member of a tribe and does not live on or near a reservation" and "an enrolled
member living on or near a reservation").
116. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Antelope, 430 U.S.
at 646). Thus, "[t]he legislative classifications the Court has upheld have often been directed
not towards 'Indians' as such but towards members of federally recognized tribes and, at least
in some instances, have actually excluded some persons who would have been deemed
Indians by race." Meyers, 905 F. Supp. at 1570 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).
Compare Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, Red Lake, Minn., 496 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that a "classification must be limited to members of federally
recognized tribes, not just people of some American Indian ancestry, otherwise strict scrutiny
would apply"), with Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694
F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1982) ("If the preference in fact furthers Congress' special
obligation, then afortiori it is a political rather than racial classification, even though racial
criteria might be used in defining who is an eligible Indian.").
117. See, e.g., Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2001) (analyzing as a racial
classification a prison requirement that "[i]nmates requesting Native American faith items"
demonstrate Native American "heritage," either by tribal membership, by BIA card
possession, or by proof of "blood relati[onship]" to a Native American); Williams, 115 F.3d at
663-66 (addressing "grave" constitutional questions raised by a statutory preference if
interpreted to apply broadly and exclusively to Native Alaskans with no discernible relation to
"Indian land, tribal status, self-government or culture"); In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d
692, 727-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating an application of the Indian Child Welfare
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW
That this interpretation of equal protection is significant and culturally
counterintuitive, if not radical, may best be demonstrated by examining the
content of actual federal Indian legislation." 8 Paradigmatic in this respect is the
1978 Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 119 which governs the placement of
children who are members, or whose parents are members, of federally
recognized tribes. 120 Normally, under prevailing principles of American family
law as informed by the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, the racial
attributes of a child and of prospective adoptive parents (to the extent they are
relevant at all) may at most be considered as one of many factors, and certainly
Act, which classifies by Indian ancestry, in the absence of uniquely Indian concerns). As one
court has explained:
A distinction must be drawn between governmental requirements
affecting the American Indian as a political classification and those
affecting the American Indian as a racial classification .... [L]aws or
practices in the former category are "closely related to furthering the
federally recognized interests of political sovereignty and tribal self-
government and the classifications consequently depend on tribal
membership or proximity to reservations." Those in the latter category,
however, are directed to a "racial" group consisting of "Indians," and are
to be judged no differently than other classifications based on race.
State v. Chavis, 263 S.E.2d 356, 359 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (citations omitted) (quoting Booker
v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 451 F. Supp. 659, 667 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 585
F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979)), review denied, 267 S.E.2d 679
(N.C. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). But see Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F. Supp.
914, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[R]egulations regarding Indians are not considered 'racial,'
regardless of whether the Indians in question are affiliated with treaty tribes."), aff'd, 70 F.3d
539 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996); Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race,
49 UCLA L. Rev. 1373, 1378-80, 1383-86 (2000) (criticizing Williams and Santos Y. for
racializing Indian identity).
118. See, e.g., Costello, supra note 109, at 817 & n. 19 (listing several "federal laws and
programs specifically designed to benefit members of Indian tribes").
119. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (Nov. 8, 1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1963 (2004)). The ICWA governs child custody proceedings, including foster care
placement, parental rights termination, preadoptive placement, and adoptive placement. See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2004).
120. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2004) (defining an "Indian child" as "any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe"); id § 1903(8) (defining "Indian tribe" as "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to
Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native
village as defined in section 1602(c) of Title 43").
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cannot comprise the determinative factor, in a child custody proceeding. 121
Under the ICWA, by contrast, the Indian status of a child can function as the
principal consideration in a placement decision,' 22 particularly if so dictated by
tribal resolution 123 or by "the prevailing social and cultural standards of the
121. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that,
under Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), "race may not be the sole factor in determining
the best interests of the child"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); McLaughlin v. Pernsley,
693 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("[W]hen a governmental entity ... determines
foster care placements [solely] on the basis of race, any such decision made by racial
classification is inherently suspect and must be subjected to the most exacting judicial
scrutiny."), aff'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633 in Circ.
Ct. of Wash. County, 646 A.2d 1036, 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) ("While race may be
considered legitimately as one of the factors in making the ultimate placement decision, courts
that have addressed the issue agree that race may not be used in an automatic fashion to
prescribe the appropriate adoptive placement.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809
(1995); In re Carpenter, No. 217634, 1999 WL 33409752, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1999)
(per curiam) ("Race may not be the sole factor in determining the best interests of the child.");
Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70, 83 (Neb. 2000) (holding that "a child's racial identity is one
factor among several that may be considered in making custody determinations"); In re
Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("The difficulties inherent in
interracial adoption justify consideration of race as a relevant factor in adoption, but do not
justify race as being the determinative factor."); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 624 (Pa. 1983)
(explaining that "race cannot be unduly emphasized either by the placement agency or hearing
court"); see also Cassondra L. Wiedenhoeft, Should Race Be Considered in the Adoption of a
Child?, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 600, 600-01 (2000) (noting that "[sleveral federal court
decisions ... [in the late 1960s and early 1970s] held that prohibiting transracial adoptions
was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause"). But cf Renner, supra note
115, at 165-66 (contending that "placing a child in a similar racial or cultural environment is a
common procedure in adoptions" and that "there is good reason to expect that the [Supreme]
Court would treat such racial preferences as a non-objectionable, 'benign' discrimination").
By federal statute, moreover, it is generally unlawful to deny an adoption or foster care
placement "on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the individual, or of the child,
involved," 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(l)(A)-(B) (2004), but the law expressly provides that it "shall
not be construed to affect the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act . Id §
1996b(3).
122. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2004) (providing that, absent good cause to the contrary,
preference shall be given in adoptive placements to "(1) a member of the child's extended
family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families"); id §
1915(b) (providing that, absent good cause to the contrary, preference shall be given in foster
care or preadoptive placements to "a member of the Indian child's extended family" or to
various tribally operated or approved Indian institutions); Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto
Itself The Indian Child Welfare Act as Inapplicable and Inappropriate to the
Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption Controversy, 38 Brandeis L.J. 47, 57 (1999-2000)
(noting that "the race-matching preferences of the ICWA ... compel state courts to recognize
the Indian child's extended family, a concept foreign to most adoption proceedings").
123. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (2004) ("[Ihf the Indian child's tribe shall establish a
different order of preference by resolution, the agency or court effecting the placement shall
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Indian community,"'' 24 and it can clearly be the determinative factor regarding
whether the matter is heard in the first instance by a tribal rather than a state
court.
125
Despite this glaring anomaly, but congruent with the aforementioned
equal protection analysis, courts have generally refused to strictly scrutinize
either the ICWA's substantive directives 126 or its jurisdictional provisions, 127
precisely "because the [statute's] classification of Indians is a classification of a
sovereign political entity, not a suspect racial classification.' ' 28 Importantly,
though, a child's Indian ancestry is relevant only when it is linked to
membership in a federally recognized tribe, 129 a limitation that has also been
uniformly sustained under the guarantee of equal protection.' 30 Pursuant to this
follow such order so long as the placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to the
particular needs of the child.").
124. Id. § 1915(d).
125. See id § 1911 (a) (providing for exclusive tribal court jurisdiction "over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by
existing Federal law"); id. § 191 1(b) (providing that, "[i]n any State court proceeding for the
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child ... the court, in
the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of
the tribe"); Renner, supra note 115, at 156-61 (summarizing the ICWA's jurisdictional
provisions).
126. See, e.g., In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) ("[T]he ICWA
does not involve a suspect class. Federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes is not based
upon impermissible racial classifications, but derives from the special status of Indians as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.") (citation omitted), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d
374 (Ill. 1990), cerl. denied, 498 U.S. 940 (1990); State ex rel. Children's Servs. Div. v.
Graves, 848 P.2d 133, 134 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("The different treatment of Indians and non-
Indians resulting from ICWA does not violate the equal protection guarantee implicit in the
Fifth Amendment, because the classification of Indians is a classification of a sovereign
political entity, not a suspect racial classification."), review denied, 854 P.2d 940 (Or. 1993).
127. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980); Renner,
supra note 115, at 155-56 (noting cases).
128. Graves, 848 P.2d at 134.
129. See In re T.I.S., 586 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Il1. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 591
N.E.2d 22 (Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 880 (1992); In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627, 632 &
n.3 (Vt. 1989).
130. See, e.g., TILS., 586 N.E.2d at 692-93 (holding that the ICWA's witholding of
benefits from members of tribes not federally recognized does not violate equal protection); In
re A.J., 733 A.2d 36, 37-38 (Vt. 1999) (holding the same as T.I.S.). Conversely, when the
ICWA is applied on the sole basis of ethnicity, without any linkage to tribal or other uniquely
Indian concerns, it will presumably be subjected to strict scrutiny and, in turn, may be deemed
unlawful. See, e.g., In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 727-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that such an application is invalid).
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statute, in fact, tribes themselves uniquely possess legal prerogatives in the
placement of Indian children,' 3 1 including a jurisdictional priority,132 a right to
notice of pending state court proceedings,' 33 and "a right to intervene at any
point" in such proceedings.' 34 Collectively these prerogatives reflect the fact
that the ICWA is intended not simply "to protect the best interests of Indian
children"' 3 5-which is otherwise the singular focus of family law' 36-but also
"to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families"'37 insofar as
"no resource... is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian
tribes than their children . ,,138
131. Christine Metteer states:
In most [non-ICWA] proceedings, the child's best interests form the
basis for placement decisions, and those interests might include both a
chance to maintain cultural identity and a permanent, stable home. This
standard practice of "child-centered decision-making" does not take into
account other, external interests. Under the ICWA, however, child
placement decisions also take into account the tribes' interest in their
own continued existence, and, in fact, the tribes' interests may even
become paramount.
See Metteer, supra note 122, at 57 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Margaret Howard,
Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 503,
547 (1984)).
132. See 25 U.S.C. § 191 (a)-(b) (2004).
133. See id. § 1912(a).
134. Id. § 1911(c).
135. Id. § 1902.
136. See, e.g., In re D.D.H., 538 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) ("It is settled
law that the determinative factor in deciding between two or more qualified and suitable
persons is the best interest of the child."); In re Aldridge, 841 S.W.2d 793, 802 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) ("In all legal proceedings involving custody of a child, the prime consideration and
ultimately determinative factor is the welfare and best interest of the child."); Kjellgren v.
Kjellgren, 730 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (explaining that "[i]n adjudicating
custody and visitation rights, the most important factor to be considered is the best interests of
the child"); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he child's best
interest is the paramount consideration. It is the polestar, the alpha and omega.") (emphasis in
original); Cloutier v. Queen, 545 S.E.2d 574, 579 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) ("In determining child
custody issues, . . . the trial court's paramount concern and the determinative factor must
remain the 'best interests of the child,' regardless of what the parents desire.") (internal quote
omitted).
137. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2004).
138. Id. § 1901(3). Indeed, "[t]he Act sides with Native Americans even where,
arguably, the result may be in conflict with the 'best interest of the child."' Michael J. Dale,
State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of
the Child Test, 27 Gonz. L. Rev. 353, 355 (1991).
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The Indian Child Welfare Act is particularly illustrative because, in
addition to confirming the specific status of Indian classifications under the
guarantee of equal protection, it underscores more generally the unique
conceptualization and posture of tribes as compared to conventional legal
doctrine and as a matter of federal law and policy. Precisely because they are
political rather than racial or ethnic in their essential character, tribes and tribal
members may be singled out and treated differently by the ICWA without
having to confront strict scrutiny under the equal protection guarantee. And,
being predominantly sovereign rather than associational or proprietary in
nature, tribes under the ICWA are accorded various interests in child placement
which are sui generis under domestic family law and which necessarily
presuppose that they possess governmental (especially parens patriae)
authority. The extent to which this unique legal status meaningfully sets tribes
apart from other minorities, and thus the extent to which Indian tribalism may
ultimately be inconsistent with the assumptions or objectives of
multiculturalism, shall be the focus of Part IV, to which the Article now turns.
IV. THE MULTICULTURAL-TRIBAL RELATIONSHIP
Examining the interplay between the premises or purposes of
multiculturalism and the intermediate- to long-term interests of tribes and their
members, and then delineating their most appropriate relationship, is by no
means an easy task. It implicates a daunting array of legal, historical, political,
economic, and cultural variables that are difficult to fully compile, much less
thoroughly assess. It is nonetheless a necessary task, lest the eventual
relationship between multiculturalism and Indian tribalism-wherever it may
fall on the associational continuum-be inadvertently or thoughtlessly
determined by forces and circumstances largely extrinsic to the tribes
themselves and, hence, dangerously oblivious to their unique status and to the
consequences of this eventual relationship with regard to that status.
This Part will attempt to undertake such an analysis. It will do so in
two Sections. Section A will divide the present relationship into broad
categories of convergence and divergence, which in turn will canvass a variety
of conceptual and practical dimensions, roughly corresponding to those
addressed in the two sections, respectively, of Part II. Then, in Section B, the
Article will bring these various points of convergence and divergence into
sharper focus by presenting and assessing three normative models that could
guide the future relationship between multiculturalism and Indian tribalism.
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A. Present Empirical Realities
1. Convergences
At first blush, the historical travail and present circumstances of many
tribal Indians would appear to make them an ideal constituent of the
multiculturalism movement, whether as participant or as beneficiary. Several
factors create this impression. First and foremost, tribal Indians comprise, both
conventionally and generally speaking, a non-white racial or ethnic minority.
As a consequence, they are arguably situated within the presumptive domain of
multiculturalist concerns. This characterization obtains even though their
collective status is very much political and governmental, as Part III makes
clear. For their membership criteria, and hence their membership rolls, are
overwhelmingly if not always premised in part on demonstrable ancestry.'
39
It is not simply the racial dimension of Indians, however, that catches
the multiculturalist's eye; it is also their undeniable history of mistreatment at
the hands of Western civilization. Even a cursory reading of this history
indicates that they possess one of the most visibly compelling claims for
139. "Virtually all tribal membership qualifications themselves contain two
requirements: a political affiliation and a tribal blood quantum." Williams, supra note 58, at
803 (citing Blackfeet Const. art. II, amend. III §§ 1 (a)-(c); Cheyenne River Sioux Const. art.
II, § 1; Colorado River Indian Const. art. II, § 1; Hopi Const. art. II, §§ 1-2; Maricopa Ak-
Chin Articles of Ass'n art. Il, §§ 1 (a)-(d); I American Indian Policy Review Comm'n, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., Final Report 108-09 (Comm. Print 1977)). See also Crow Tribal Const. art.
III, § l(a) ("one-quarter (1/4) Crow Indian blood or more"), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/crowconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Nez
Perce Tribe Const. art. IV, § I(B) (rev. 1999) ("at least one-fourth (1/4) degree Nez Perce
Indian ancestry"), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/nezperce_
constandbylaws.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Colville Confederated Tribal Law & Order
Code § 8-1-80 ("one-fourth degree of the blood"), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder/colvillelawandorderCHPT8-1.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Grand
Traverse Band Code §§ 301, 304 ("'one-fourth (1/4) Indian blood"' for adoption into the
tribe) (quoting Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Const. art. II, §
l(b)(3)(a)), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/travcode7enroll.htm
(last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Skokomish Tribal Code § 1.01.010(a)(3) ("at least one-fourth (1/4)
degree Skokomish blood"), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
skokomish tribalcode 1 .htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). In addition, federal courts appear to
presuppose a racial or ancestral component to the definition of Indian, at least for
jurisdictional purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996);
Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1178 (1996);
United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995). For critiques of the federal
emphasis on race as a determinative element of tribal membership, see Brownell, supra note
97; John Rockwell Snowden, Wayne Tyndall & David Smith, American Indian Sovereignty
and Naturalization: It's a Race Thing, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 171 (2001).
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reparative social justice, grounded in a record of domestic oppression rivaled in
gravity and duration only by that of black Americans. 40 Without doubt, the
course of Indian relations both with the federal government and with the states,
and more generally with the nation's citizenry and institutions, has been shaped
and to some extent continues to be shaped by racial or racist beliefs and
practices,14' and has been characterized by various forms of systematic
economic, cultural, and religious oppression.142 Particularly at the individual
140. See Arthur N. Frakt, Affirmative Action: A Dean's Reflections, 5 Widener J. Pub. L.
1, 19-20 (1995) ("Obviously, some minorities have suffered substantially greater hardships
than others. African Americans and Native Americans both have unique historical records of
being subjected to discrimination, neglect and overt hostility from the majority society.");
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean By Home": Toward a
Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 569, 593
(observing that "few other groups of Americans have experienced the massive, systematic
dislocation and oppression weathered by Native Americans and African Americans").
141. James Boggs states:
Notions about the inferiority of Native American culture and its
detrimental influences on Native American persons underlie many
aspects of federal Indian policy. Federal policies throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were directed toward "blotting
out" the "barbarous dialects" of Native American tribes and "gradually
obliterating" their distinct customs and differences. Few questioned that
this effort was in the Indians' best interests.
James P. Boggs, NEPA in the Domain of Federal Indian Policy: Social Knowledge and the
Negotiation of Meaning, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 31, 52 n.108 (1991) (citation omitted)
(quoting Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis 21-22 (1976)). See, e.g., James
B. Jacobs & Jessica S. Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic, 86 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 366, 387-88 (1996); see generally David E. Wilkins, American Indian
Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (1997) (explaining how
certain legal doctrines have surreptitiously permitted the enforcement of underlying notions of
cultural superiority). For an exhaustive and disturbing account within one geographical
context, see Thomas Biolsi, Deadliest Enemies: Law and the Making of Race Relations On
and Off the Rosebud Reservation (2001).
142. See Goldberg, supra note 106, at 263 ("What Native Americans share with African
Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and many other racial or ethnic minorities is a history
of discrimination, economic marginalization, and forced assimilation."). Regarding religious
oppression, in particular, see George Dargo, Religious Toleration and Its Limits in Early
America, 16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 341, 358-60 (1996); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and
Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century
Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 773, 787-805 (1997) (recounting 19th
century federal governmental suppression of Indian ceremonial dancing, notably the Sioux
Ghost Dance); Lee Irwin, Freedom, Law, and Prophecy: A Brief History of Native American
Religious Resistance, 21 Am. Indian Q. 35 (1997), available at 1997 WL 19004830; John
Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans, 52 Mont. L.
Rev. 13 (1991).
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tribal level, it would not be an overstatement to describe some of this past
oppression as genocidal. 43 Even today, Indians remain subject to certain forms
of discrimination' 44 and ethnic stereotyping, 145 especially of a sort that is
defended on the ground that it is either benignly generic or genuinely
ennobling. 146
143. See Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of
the Native American Experience, 34 Kan. L. Rev. 713, 714 (1986); Rose Weston, Note,
Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to the Historic
Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1017, 1044-
45 (2001).
144. See Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Strategies, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 261, 261 n.3 (2002)
(discussing discrimination against Indians, particularly in certain western states); Jeanette
Wolfley, Jim Crow, Indian Style: The Disenfranchisement of Native Americans, 16 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 167, 195-202 (1991) (discussing recent forms of voting-related
discrimination). More generally, there has been a persistence of various socioeconomic and
related disparities. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 1, at 5-6, 8-10 (discussing various economic,
infrastructural, health-related, and educational problems); Rebecca L. Case, Comment, Not
Separate but Not Equal: How Should the United States Address its International Obligations
To Eradicate Racial Discrimination in the Public Education System?, 21 Penn St. Int'l L.
Rev. 205, 207 (2002) ("Studies show that African American, Latino, and Native American
students have higher dropout rates, higher suspension and expulsion rates, decreased access to
advanced placement courses, and fewer college applicants than Caucasian students."); Indians
Have Lowest Graduation Rates in Wyo., Native Am. L. Dig., Jan. 2003, at 15 (noting that the
Indian graduate rate in Wyoming is 47%, while the state average is 76.6%); S.D. Has
Disproportionate Number of Indians in Prison, Native Am. L. Dig., Dec. 2002, at 4 (reporting
that Indians comprise 9% of South Dakota's population, but 23% of the state's prison
population).
145. See Jeffrey R. Hanson & Linda P. Rouse, Dimensions of Native American
Stereotyping, 11.4 Am. Indian Cult. & Research J. 33 (1987) (reviewing evidence of
stereotyping across several cultural fronts). On the conceptual construction of Indians, see
Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from
Columbus to the Present (1978); Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes
and U.S. Indian Policy (1982); Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian
Hating and Empire Building (1980); John F. Moffitt & Santiago Sebastian, 0 Brave New
People: The European Invention of the American Indian (1996); Roy H. Pearce, Savagism and
Civilization 73 (rev. ed. 1988); Raymond Stedman, Shadows of the Indian: Stereotypes in
American Culture (1982); Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American
Popular Culture (S. Elizabeth Bird ed., 1986); White on Red: Images of the American Indian
(Nancy B. Black & Bette S. Weidman eds., 1976); The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions and
Government Policies (James A. Clifton ed., 1990).
146. Most commonly this occurs in the area of athletic logos or mascots. See Kristine A.
Brown, Native American Team Names and Mascots: Disparaging and Insensitive or Just Part
of the Game?, 9 Sports Law. J. 115 (2002); Kristin E. Behrendt, Comment, Cancellation of
the Washington Redskins' Federal Trademark Registrations: Should Sports Team Names,
Mascots and Logos Contain Native American Symbolism?, 10 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 389
(2000); Aaron Goldstein, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Another Attempt
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Nor are these merely the societal vestiges of bygone governmental
policies. Even certain modem doctrines and laws-in this ostensible era of self-
determination-arguably perpetuate conceptions of Indians and tribal
governments that range from patronizing to demeaning.147 In turn, and
consistent with the postmodem ontological framework of the multiculturalism
movement, some have maintained that such conceptions are little more than a
form of social construction that effectively serve a subordinating function.
48
For example, it has been posited that the criteria which form the basis of
modem federal tribal recognition "assume an 'ideal tribe' . . . premised on [a]
Romantic image of the Indian," and that "certain tribes or bands that may
at Eliminating Native American Mascots, 3 J. Gender Race & Just. 689 (2000); Daniel J.
Trainor, Note, Native American Mascots, Schools, and the Title VI Hostile Environment
Analysis, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 971 (1995); Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the
Use of Indian Team Names and Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 904
(1999).
147. See, e.g., Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The
Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 21 (2000) (arguing that federal statutes requiring consultation between tribes and federal
agencies prior to state action vest tribes with uncertain benefits and create ambiguous
responsibilities for federal officials); Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust
Relationship After Mitchell, 31 Cath. U. L. Rev. 635, 681 (1982) (observing that the federal-
Indian trust relationship has "patronizing, colonial overtones"); Irene K. Harvey, Note,
Congressional Plenary Power Over Indian Affairs-A Doctrine Rooted in Prejudice, 10 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 117 (1982) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine, still invoked today, rests
on the alleged inferiority of Indians). Also,
th[e] tribal exhaustion doctrine was largely derived from existing legal
rules that governed the review of inferior forums in administrative and
habeas corpus actions. . . . [T]his view of tribal courts at once demeans
the tribal courts and, more significantly, could lead to a serious erosion
of tribal sovereignty generally.
Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on the Good
Roads, and You've Got Nothing to Worry About," 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 65, 162 (1997).
148. See, e.g., Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 585, 589 (1994) (examining
"how the cultural construction of the Native American operates in the emerging law of
concurrent jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and perpetuates the
subordination of Native American culture, families, and individuals-a subordination that the
Act ostensibly counters"); see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 Emory L.J. 587
(2002) (offering a postmodern analytical critique of the ICWA); see generally Luana Ross,
Inventing the Savage: The Social Construction of Native American Criminality (1998)
(assessing the ties between the loss of sovereignty and Native American criminality).
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otherwise deserve recognition may be denied it simply because they fail to
adhere to th[is] Romantic image .. . .,149 According to this critique,
the assumptions behind the criteria are more than merely mistaken;
they represent more than the imposition of European conceptions of
culture on an alien context.... [T]he recognition process, as part of
the discourse of the Indian, may be understood as a technology of
regulation, of disciplinary power that has made possible a more
efficient control of American Indians.
1 50
Even the very notion of a tribe-as a distinct, geographically situated
entity-appears at least in part to be a Western construct that has acquired its
content substantially through legal reification and cultural reinforcement. 5'
149. Dan Gunter, The Technology of Tribalism: The Lemhi Indians, Federal
Recognition, and the Creation of Tribal Identity, 35 Idaho L. Rev. 85, 89 (1998); see also
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at 1127 ("The problem with these defining characteristics[as found in the recognition criteria] is that they do not always (or even often) correspond to
the boundaries of political identity that traditionally have existed for Indian people.").
150. Gunter, supra note 149, at 89-90 (footnote omitted); see also Jo Carrillo, Identity
as Idiom: Mashpee Reconsidered, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 511 (1995) (arguing that the federal tribal
recognition laws continue to confuse tribal adaptations with tribal assimilation into the
mainstream community).
The [tribal] recognition process, and the faithful participation in it by
many tribes seeking recognition, may induce a dangerous complacency.
The danger is that self-proximity of the subject's identity is fixed so
exclusively to the federal acknowledgment that the political freedom it
allows comes to be seen as an end in itself.
William Trapani, Re/cognizing Native American Sovereignty in an Age of Manifest Manners,
3 J.L. Soc'y 1, 4-5 (2002).
151. As noted,
judicial doctrines of tribal sovereignty, together with federal laws
mandating Indian political organization at the tribal rather than the
village, kinship, or clan level, have channeled Indian political identity
and organizational activity into existing tribal entities. Yet the territorial
boundaries of these entities are often the product of federal contrivance
rather than a reflection of traditional conceptual identity or political
organization. And in their structure and operation, many reproduce non-
Indian political values rather than indigenous methods of social
organization and control.
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at 1139; id at 1145 ("Contemporary Indian tribes are an
amalgam of traditional identifications and organization, federal pressures, and Indian
improvisation."); Susan Staiger Gooding, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities in
United States v. Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
28 Law & Soc'y Rev. 1181, 1225 (1994) ("[L]egal and nonlegal naming practices... begin to
suggest the subtlety with which social and cultural rights must be addressed. The history of
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This is most evident, once again, in the criteria for federal recognition, but by
no means is it limited to that domain. Professor Goldberg, drawing in part on
the work of Stephen Cornell, 152 explains that "[c]ontact with non-Indians had
two major consequences for the evolution of Indian groups." 153 The first
consequence was political and self-conceptual integration or centralization that
effectively caused "smaller divisions within a particular cultural group [to be]
swept aside for non-Indian purposes."' 54 The second consequence "was the
creation of political entities that melded Indian groups with quite distinct
identities and self-concepts, or separated groups which thought of themselves as
one people."' 5 5 In addition, "[w]ith the passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934 (IRA), Congress engineered further adjustments in the meaning of
'tribe' and reinforced the salience of the tribe as political unit."'156 Even where
tribes themselves appear to have adopted a contemporary extrinsic
understanding of their nature and status, arguably this has occurred out of
necessity, not genuine choice. For, unless their configuration resembled this
understanding, their sovereignty, even their partial sovereignty, might not have
been (or today might not be) recognized. 1
57
the Colville Confederated Tribes is a rich resource for understanding both the pragmatics of
cultural diversity and the evolution and contradictions of rights discourse.").
152. Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence
(1988).
153. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at 1131.
154. Id. (citing Cornell, supra note 152, at 76).
155. Id. at 1132. "Not only were disparate groups melded together, but groups united in
self-concept were divided onto separate reservations and treated as distinct political entities
for purposes of treaties and recognition of sovereign powers." Id. As Professor Goldberg more
recently notes, the exogenous forces of Western culture have shaped not only political
configuration of Indians into "tribes," but also Indians as a whole into a "race":
[A]t the time of earliest European contact, the aboriginal inhabitants of
North America understood themselves solely in terms of their particular
social, cultural, and language groups, corresponding only very roughly to
modem-day "tribes." Indeed, they "had no conception of themselves as a
single 'race,' group, or people." The idea of indigenous North Americans
as a single "race" was a European invention.
Goldberg, supra note 117, at 1373-74 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Joane Nagel, American
Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture 3 (1997)).
156. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at 1133. "Formal political unity, with apparent
Indian 'consent,' was superimposed on whatever cultural and political diversity existed on the
reservation, whether it was the combination of distinct peoples or the superseding of surviving
traditions of subtribal autonomy." Id.
157. See Berta Esperanza Hemrndez-Truyol, The Latindia and Mestizajes: Of Cultures,
Conquests, and LatCritical Feminism, 3 J. Gender Race & Just. 63, 91 (1999) (explaining that
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Likewise it has been argued that the nature of tribal sovereignty, rather
than existing objectively, actually "subsists in a field of contingencies"' 58 and
that the Supreme Court's variable "use of language ... situate[s] tribes in
relation to the federal government, either in positions of normative equipoise..
• or in positions of subordination .... .""9 More specifically, the Court
"institutionalizes tribal sovereignty within the matrix of American democratic
structure through language that alternately affirms tribal political existence into
perpetuity and consigns such political existence to the whims of a superior
power.' 60 This, in turn, "suggests that ... the ultimate determination of the
nature or scope of tribal power and rights operates in relation to broader
national institutional imperatives[,]' 161 the identification of which "often sheds
light on the Court's conceptualization of tribal sovereignty that, in
presentational form, is revealed through language that employs transpositional
and/or subjugated discourse."'' 62
As with other historically oppressed groups, moreover, the identity of
Indian tribalism is in part a function of resistance to the various forces of
subjugation. In particular, Indian identity, or what might be called Indian pride,
is frequently, if not necessarily, tied to each tribe's history of conflict and
survival vis-A-vis the colonization efforts of European nations and the westward
manifest destiny of the United States. In turn, there would appear to be
substantial congruence between Indian self-identification and postmodem
multiculturalist thinking, the latter of which not only emphasizes the themes of
oppression and resistance, but also encourages the realization or actualization of
self-understanding particularly as against one's oppressor. This is true even to
the European "conceptualization of 'state' created a problem with respect to the integrity and
sovereignty of Native peoples whose organizational system(s) were not like the European
structures upon which the model was constituted"). "Native groups have not passively
submitted to these forces; but the story of their distinctive conflicts over, and responses to,
American law demonstrate how groups can appropriate powerful outside pressures to sustain
an evolving sense of their identity and community." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at
1124.
158. N. Bruce Duthu, Incorporative Discourse in Federal Indian Law: Negotiating
Tribal Sovereignty Through the Lens of Native American Literature, 13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.
141, 150-51 (2000).
159. Id. at 150.
160. Id. Accordingly, "[t]he verticalized positions of Indians as subordinate entities in
relation to superior Euro-American entities ensures that the narrative, and hence, legal
discourse, proceeds to its rightful conclusion, where Euro-American political, legal, and
economic hegemony over Indians is maintained." Id. at 165.
161. Id at 150-51.
162. Id. at 151.
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the extent that Indian identity, being thus tethered to Western subjugation, is
consequently, though partially, a secondary product of social construction.1 63 In
particular, multiculturalist thinking can at least create or enhance awareness of
this reality-a reality which, in all events, multiculturalism itself did not
create. 164
The conceptual construction and subjugation of Indian tribalism by
Western legal and societal institutions reflect not merely the exertion of unequal
power, but more generally a preexisting, persistent, and critical disjunction
between these two cultural traditions. There is, in one author's words, a "clash
of cultures with radically different epistemologies .... "165 Perhaps the most
illustrative realm of cultural dissonance is that of religion, especially the
treatment of Indian religious freedom claims by non-Indian courts applying
conventional constitutional doctrine. According to one scholar, "[t]he[se] courts
do not understand the nature of Indian religious beliefs because most judges are
confined intellectually by Judeo-Christian notions of what constitutes a
religion," and "[t]his bias is reflected in the judicially constructed legal
doctrines for determining the constitutional validity of religious claims .... 66
In turn, "because these doctrines are framed in Western concepts of religiosity,
they are prejudicial to the non-Western religions of Native Americans."'
67
163. See John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial
Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 419, 431-33 (2000) (discussing the phenomenon of marginalized
groups "mak[ing] what seems like a radical move from the dominant discourse" but which is,
"in actuality, a strategy firmly embedded in and derivative of the dominant discourse" and
that, "[t]o the extent that they remain only oppositional, or try to assimilate as an end, they
also remain dependent on the dominant discourse that they seek to challenge"). Likewise, the
ethnicity-based classification of "Native American" is itself a construction "'imposed on
American Indians from U.S. Society .... an outsider's view, and an inaccurate one."' Velie,
supra note 7, at 204 (quoting Native Resistance, supra note 7).
164. Moreover, as one commentator points out, "[i]f [Indians] do not begin the process
of redefining who [they] are, others will do it for [them]." Perry Horse, Sovereignty in
Spiritual Perspective, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 117, 119 (2000).
165. Jace Weaver, Other Words: American Indian Literature, Law, and Culture 182
(2001).
166. Rhodes, supra note 142, at 17.
167. Id. at 16-17. See also Brian E. Brown, Religion, Law, and the Land: Native
Americans and the Judicial Interpretation of Sacred Land (1999) ("In its refusal to accord
constitutional protection to tribal belief and practice, the Supreme Court prevented religion
from . . . liberating land as a sacred reality .... "); Weaver, supra note 165, at 179-88
(supporting the proposition that different concepts of religion have impacted Native American
religion negatively); Lori G. Beaman, Aboriginal Spirituality and the Legal Construction of
Freedom of Religion, 44 J. Church & St. 135 (2002) (supporting the same); Dussias, supra
note 142, at 805-19 (discussing various definitional and conceptual problems); Bryan J. Rose,
Comment, A Judicial Dilemma: Indian Religion, Indian Land, and the Religion Clauses, 7
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While religious freedom claims and their judicial treatment may best
demonstrate the cosmological or epistemological differences between Indian
and Western perspectives, by no means are they unique in this regard. To the
contrary, these differences, and the dissonances they engender, pervade and
affect the entire Indian-Western relationship. Notions of family and
parenting,1 68 understandings of law and justice, 169 perspectives on human
relationships to the environment,17  views towards land and property
ownership,' 71 and even conceptions of time 172 in many instances vary greatly
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 103 (1999) (discussing the problems created by applying Supreme
Court jurisprudence to Indian religion cases).
The continuing inability of our society to comprehend and appreciate the
religions of Native Americans is reflected in first amendment [sic] case
law, both in the results of the cases, which frequently deny Indian
religious rights, and in the flavor of the opinions, which rarely transcend
Judeo-christian [sic] notions of religion to grasp the spirituality of
American Indian religions.
Rhodes, supra note 142, at 35.
168. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of
Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 1051, 1106, n.239 (1989) (noting "[d]ifferent
cultural views of parental responsibility" and citing tribal court cases "acknowledg[ing] the
different world views held by Indian and non-Indian societies"); Linda J. Lacey, The White
Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 327
(1986) (canvassing historical differences and the impact of federal policy on Indian families);
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 225,
254-55 (1994) (explaining that one thing "that distinguishes the custom underlying tribal law
from Anglo-American law is the definition of the immediate family and the role of extended
family ... [such as] tribal domestic relations, child custody, and probate cases, include
definitions of family and role broader than the definitions in Anglo-American law.").
169. See William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to
Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in Indian
Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 551, 564-67 (2000) (noting "the many layers of
difference between traditional Indian justice systems and the Anglo-European justice system"
and contrasting these systems).
170. See Douglas W. Ackerman, Kennewick Man: The Meaning of "Cultural
Affiliation" and "Major Scientific Benefit" in the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, 33 Tulsa L.J. 359, 375 (1997) ("Whereas Anglo-American traditions see
humans as clearly below God and above other animals, Native American traditions do not
make sharp distinctions among these three groups; further, humans are free to interact with
gods and other animals.") (footnote omitted).
171. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 473
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting "the longstanding conflict between two disparate
cultures-dominant Western culture, which views land in terms of ownership and use, and
that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property are not only alien, but
contrary to a belief system that holds land sacred"); Ackerman, supra note 170, at 377
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between the Indian and Western worlds.' 73 Indeed, so stark and "irreconcilable
[are the] cultural differences between Native Americans and Anglo-Americans
[that they] are thought to be the reason for Native American and Anglo-
American military conflict, for if Anglo-Americans could not make Native
Americans conform to Anglo-American ideas--e.g., private property, rational
empiricism, monotheism-they, instead, conquered them."'
174
This Indian-Western disjunction is not merely an empirical feature or
phenomenon; it also exists and has consequences at a thematic and
philosophical level as well. For example, American culture has until recent
years included a strong ideal of assimilation or homogenization, often described
using the metaphor of a melting pot. Yet, this ideal has clearly not been easy to
achieve in relation to many Indian groups-and, to some extent, other groups-
who are beholden and committed to a radically different worldview, especially
one that stresses their own geopolitical autonomy. The multiculturalism
movement, by contrast, insofar as it rejects this ideal,1 75 seems able to promise
to tribal Indians a vision of cultural acceptance and co-existence which for so
many generations they have been denied. Within the realm of law, for example,
the multiculturalist ethos has led some to advocate that "legal discourse ...
(discussing the concept of private ownership); Mark A. Godsey, Educational Inequalities, the
Myth of Meritocracy, and the Silencing of Minority Voices: The Need for Diversity on
America's Law Reviews, 12 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 59, 69 (1995) ("Most of [America's]
property law concepts, such as 'first in time-first in right,' true ownership, inheritance,
adverse possession, and future interests, are uniquely European in origin. Most Native
American tribes, however, believe that land is something to be shared and worshipped instead
of owned.") (footnote omitted). According to one author, moreover, "[c]urrent
cases... indicate that many jurists still do not understand the differences between Western
and Indian property values." Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering
Entitlement Under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 49, 54 n.26 (2002) (citing Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349 (5th Cir.
2001)).
172. See Ackerman, supra note 170, at 374 ("Anglo-Americans conceive of time
linearly, starting with a beginning and proceeding toward an end, whereas Native Americans
have a cyclical, or spatial, conception of time.") (footnote omitted); see generally The
American Indian and the Problem of History (Calvin Martin ed. 1987) (exploring various
American Indian conceptions of time).
173. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text:
Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights, 55 Md. L. Rev. 84, 97-102 (1996)
(illuminating many of these differences as well as others).
174. Ackerman, supra note 170, at 381 (citing Pearce, supra note 145, at 73).
175. See, e.g., Minn. Indep. Sch. Forum, supra note 9 ("[T]he 'melting pot' metaphor no
longer reflects, if it ever did, the cultural make-up of the nation. Our diverse and pluralistic
society is more accurately described as a 'salad bowl' .... Multicultural education takes the
'salad bowl' concept as a starting point.").
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incorporate[] the emerging and evolving narrative traditions of Indigenous
Peoples" in order "to awaken the mind to reconceptualize the place of Native
Americans within American society and to ignite the imaginative possibilities
of more inclusive, respectful, and peacefully co-existing communities."
'1 76
At the same time, certain segments of multiculturalism support the
notion of group separationism, which is obviously a notion that many
proponents of tribal sovereignty or self-determination would find agreeable, at
least in the abstract. 177 For the very reason that individual identities and the
communities they comprise are seen as constructs, and in keeping with notions
of autonomy and self-realization, multiculturalism seems to invite, if not
demand, the formation and recognition of separate, affinity-based communities,
as long as these communities subscribe to minimal liberal ideals such as
tolerance, civil equality, and participatory governance.178 In turn, to the extent
that Indian groups are seen as constituents of the multicultural vision, such
separationist efforts could very well benefit from these and similar arguments
and perspectives. Among other things, this would include the particularism that
is often implicitly, if not explicitly, part of the multiculturalist framework.
179
176. Duthu, supra note 158, at 143.
177. In fact, multicultural separationism appears to be increasingly countenanced.
According to a recent poll conducted by the NAACP and Hamilton
College, American young people are no longer interested in racial
integration. Although intensely supportive of racial equality, they remain
content to see America's racial communities separated and disconnected.
Fifty percent of those polled believe that it's "OK if the races are
basically separate as long as everyone has equal opportunities."
Editorial, Struggling with Who We Are, Deseret News, Aug. 28, 1999, at A10, available at
1999 WL 26547033.
178. See Ford, supra note 46, at 1807 ("What joins multiculturalism and identity
politics ... is the commitment to defend certain practices and expressions because they are
subjectively important to an individual's or a group's sense of self."). Professor Ford
distinguishes these movements from what he calls antisubordination politics, noting that an
embrace of both perspectives would be logically problematic. For purposes of this Article,
multiculturalism is conceptualized as encompassing both identity politics and
antisubordination politics, without the attendant claim that this dual embrace is either
universal or logical.
179. Cultural particularism generally denies the existence of objective or universal
standards by which cultures can be normatively assessed, and it often further rejects the
possibility or desirability of a common culture. See Carrington, supra note 4, at 1111; Joshua
Parens, Multiculturalism and the Problem of Particularism, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 169, 169
(1994) ("In lieu of the cultural universalism of the melting pot, multiculturalists prefer a more
particularistic view of culture."). According to Professor Parens,
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For, just as many particularists reject the notions of universal cultural norms
that, by virtue of their alleged status, may be coercively enforced against
deviant societies or practices, tribal Indians largely reject the notion that
Western civilization is intrinsically or objectively superior, and that the
conquest of the last several centuries was morally justifiable on that basis.
Finally, it is beyond question that the multiculturalism movement has
yielded tangible benefits for tribal Indians, just as it has yielded such benefits
more generally for Native Americans and certain other racial or ethnic groups.
Opportunities and participation in higher education,' 80 employment in virtually
all trades and professions,' 81 involvement and representation in regional and
Multiculturalists can be divided into three types: egalitarian
antiessentialists, their fellow travelers, and separatist essentialists.
Egalitarian antiessentialists believe that cultures do not have essences.
Because cultures are constructed by their adherents, they may be
deconstructed. By means of deconstruction, rather than universal
principles of action, one can achieve a truly inclusive society. Fellow
travelers of the egalitarian antiessentialists acknowledge that difference
may in the long run be capable of deconstruction, but they deny that
every community in the United States has achieved sufficient cultural
identity to have its identity deconstructed. Separatist essentialists view
each culture as possessing an essence. They object to the Western claim
to have access to have universal principles of action. They hint, however,
that their own culture may be better, if not more universal, than Western
culture.
Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
180. See Eleanor Babco, The Status of Native Americans in Science and Engineering
("Overall, the number of Native Americans enrolled as undergraduates increased 63% from
77,900 in 1980 to 127,200 in 1997."), available at http://ehrweb.aaas.org/mge/Reports/
Report l/Babco-StatusOfNativeAmericanslnSandE.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
181. Faith Smith, President of the Native American Educational Services College, gives
one example:
Achieving equitable access to law and professional schools for Native
people is a long process, but one which is being addressed, albeit slowly,
through affirmative action. In twenty years, the situation has improved
dramatically. We entered the twentieth century with no Native attorneys.
Those who have earned law degrees did so in the past two decades.
While equitable access is now a dream we can imagine, we are not at the
point where we can relax our vigilance about making sure that Native
people have equal preparation and access to resources and a learning
environment in which they are valued. Affirmative action continues to be
the vehicle through which these issues can be addressed.
Faith Smith, Building Native American Representation in the Law: The Need for Affirmative
Action, 12 La Raza L.J. 397, 398 (2001).
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national politics,' 82 and ambient societal awareness of Indian cultural and tribal
life' 83 have all generally been enhanced or improved by the decades-long
struggle for racial equality and by the ongoing efforts of those in the civil rights,
multiculturalist, and various other progressive communities.' 
84
Correspondingly, Indians have arguably made unique contributions to each of
these communities and their movements, including lessons on resistance, co-
existence, cultural preservation, and community cohesion.
182. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 96, at 146-54 (noting that the last ten years have seen
Indians beginning to vote in American elections in increasingly high numbers); Russ Lehman,
The Emerging Role of Native Americans in the American Electoral Process (Jan. 2003),
available at http://www.first-americans.net/ELECTORP.PDF (last visited Apr. 7, 2004);
David Wilkins, An Inquiry into Indigenous Political Participation: Implications for Tribal
Sovereignty, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 732 (2000) (discussing a substantial increase in Indian
voter registration as well as the successful election of Indian candidates to local school boards
and state government); Wolfley, supra note 144, at 192-93 ("[I]t appears that a steady number
of Indians express support for tribal sovereignty, but an increasing number believe that in
order to protect these sovereign rights they must participate in the American political process,
whether as voters, giving endorsements, engaging in volunteer campaign work for non-Indian
office seekers .... "). For current examples, see Randi Hicks Rowe, Indian Votes Key Factor
in Races, Native Am. L. Dig., Dec. 2002, at 1; Northwest Tribes Make Record Political
Contributions, Native Am. L. Dig., Feb. 2003, at 6.
183. See Ferdinand M. De Leon, A Party Unto Themselves: Native Americans Offset
Hoopla Over Columbus with Their Own Celebrations, Seattle Times, Apr. 5, 1992, at K1
(quoting Robert Eaglestaff, Principal of the Seattle Public School's American Indian Heritage
School and Program, as stating that "'the mainstream society's awareness of American Indian
issues is increasing"'); cf Ted Gup, U.S. Museums Are Locked in a Battle for Truth, Bait.
Sun, Feb. 25, 1996, at 6C ("In recent years, increasing sensitivities to race, gender and
political diversity have helped move more stolid institutions beyond narrow Eurocentricism,
leading to repatriation of Native American artifacts and reburial of human remains and a long-
overdue broadening of the public's appreciation for multiculturalism."), available at 1996 WL
5242325. Several institutions have emerged to foster this awareness, such as. the Education
Project (http://www.first-americans.net), the National Museum of the American Indian
(http://www.nmai.si.edu), and, at a more local level, the Massachusetts Center for Native
American Awareness (http://www.mcnaa.org).
184. See Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 7 ("Civil rights activism of the 1960s
and growing political and legal action by Indian people and tribes resulted in tremendous
political, social, and educational gains."). "Not until the 1960s, when the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations emphasized the welfare and economic interests of minorities, did the
American government again pay some attention to indigenous concerns." Raidza Torres, The
Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 127,
148 (1991). "This change resulted partly from increased cultural awareness of Native
American traditions and partly from President Johnson's Great Society programs, which
enabled Native Americans to obtain more federal funds and to use them at their discretion."
Id. at 148 n. 115.
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2. Divergences
It would appear, based on the foregoing, that the points of convergence
between multiculturalism and Indian tribalism are rather substantial. The
purpose at this juncture is to examine alternative perspectives on this
relationship. In particular, this section will demonstrate that several of these
points of convergence are not necessarily as strong as they may initially seem;
that there exist points of divergence that are equally numerous and in some
instances more profound or consequential; and, as a result, that any effort to
include American Indians within the rubric of multiculturalism should be
approached, at least initially, with extraordinary caution.
Consider, first of all, the most obvious issues of convergence, such as
minority racial or ethnic status, historical oppression, and contemporary
discrimination and stereotyping. It is beyond question that by and large these
characteristics are shared by both Indians and, for example, black or African
Americans, and it is also true from a public policy perspective that these are not
insignificant issues. Arguably, however, that is where the similarity ends.
Indeed, at least two substantial points of difference can be identified.
First, there is the role that these issues play in forming the identity of
Indians and the recognizable corporealization of each group. For many black
Americans, that role is arguably significant or even determinative; for many
American Indians, by contrast, it is not. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this
point is to imagine, hypothetically albeit somewhat illogically, a world in which
these issues do not exist. Were black Americans, for instance, not saddled with
the institutions of slavery, discrimination, and stereotyping, in theory they might
not constitute a sociologically significant group at all, at least no more so than,
say, contemporary Irish or Greek Americans. Were American Indians not
encumbered, however, by the institutions of termination, discrimination, and
stereotyping, among others, they would presumably still constitute legally and
politically identifiable entities, whether or not denominated tribes, with each
possessing a relatively full complement of sovereign and territorial attributes. In
short, while both "African-Americans [and Native Americans] trace their roots
to distinct tribes and share a history of oppression and family separation,"
' 8 5
"[u]nlike African Americans, Native Americans retained their own legally
recognized kinship and tribal structures, incorporated into tribal and federal
laws."'
186
185. Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Families: Building
on Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 29, 52 (1998).
186. Woodhouse, supra note 140, at 593; see also Goldberg, supra note 106, at 264
(noting that, "[i]n contrast [to Indians], members of other racial and ethnic groups came to this
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Second, there is each group's conceptual or cosmological
understanding of these issues as they pertain to the past, the present, and
especially the future. For black Americans, the widely shared ideal of equality
generally entails rendering these issues either irrelevant or nonexistent. There is,
in Dr. Martin Luther King's celebrated words, an abiding hope that Americans
might "one day live in a nation where [people] will not be judged by the color
of their skin but by the content of their character.' , 8 7 For American Indians,
however, the general ideal of tribal sovereign independence requires neither the
irrelevance nor the nonexistence of these issues.1 88 Indeed, the separationism
that this ideal both presupposes and produces seems to promise that these issues
might to some extent endure indefinitely.
It is this very point of difference, in fact, that most clearly
distinguishes the separationist and particularist dimensions of multiculturalism
from those of Indian tribalism. While Indians would likely agree to some extent
with the phenomenon of socially constructed understandings of race or
ethnicity, particularly given the various images of American Indians with which
tribes must contend, they would likely disagree that there exist no overarching,
objective standards (presumably their own) by which it may be determined that
the various races and cultures are at some level intrinsically and meaningfully
(and not merely experientially) different.' 89 They would likely also explain that
this disjunction between multicultural and Indian perspectives is neither
coincidental nor contingent. Rather, it almost certainly reflects each tribe's
fundamental cosmology, which typically recognizes the tribe's relationship to
one or more gods or spirits and articulates the tribe's own special character,
country either as individual slaves or as immigrants" and that "[tihey did not bring with them
a government or legal apparatus capable of asserting or enjoying sovereignty and property
claims on behalf of the group"); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v.
Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1401, 1415
(1993) (arguing that "the presence of an African-American culture, language, and religion
signifies the existence of a separate community," but recognizing that, unlike American
Indians, "African-Americans ... have no geographic lands to call their own, nor any claim
that their unique culture existed prior to and independently of majoritarian culture").
187. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, para. 16 (Aug. 28, 1963), available at
http://douglassarchives.org/kingb 12.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
188. See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-
Century Race Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1923, 1927 (2000) ("Indian nations ... have consistently
fought not for 'equality' within the American nation, but for some version of 'sovereignty' or
self-determination-the right to resist extinction or assimilation by the United States.").
189. In this sense, tribal worldviews are closest to the multiculturalist subtype of
separatist essentialism. See supra note 179.
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destiny, or purpose.1 90 Lastly, it is doubtful that they would agree that the
cosmological significance of their tribe is simply a contingent social construct,
and they may not even share (and need not share) the Western liberal ideal of
religious tolerance, especially in its more relativistic form.
More generally, such worldviews arguably contemplate not the unity
of cultures and ethnicities, but rather their demarcation and to some extent the
ongoing tension between them. While Indians, like other minority groups,
obviously do not desire racial discrimination or subordination, unlike other
minority groups they do not particularly seek the erasure of relevant distinctions
between their worlds and the worlds of non-Indians, whether those distinctions
are cast as racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, or philosophical.' 9' There is,
190. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American
Justice 8 (1983) ("Tribal names generally reflect the basic idea that these particular people
have been chosen from among the various peoples of the universe-including mammals,
birds, and reptiles, as well as other humans,-to hold a special relationship with the higher
powers."). Somewhat illustrative is the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Constitution,
which states that its purposes are, inter alia, to:
(1) Continue forever, with the help of God, our unique identity as Indians
and as the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon, and to
protect that identity from forces that threaten to diminish it; (2) Protect
our inherent rights as Indians and as a sovereign Indian tribe; [and] (3)
Promote our cultural and religious beliefs and to pass them on in our own
way to our children, grandchildren and grandchildren's children
forever ....
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. Const. pmbl., available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/siletzconst.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). Also:
[E]stablish[ing] our tribal government in order to: 1. Perpetuate our
unique identity as Indians and as members of the Confederated Tribes of
the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians, and to promote and
protect that Identity; 2. Secure the rights and powers inherent to us as
Indian people and as an Indian tribe; [and] 3. Preserve and promote our
cultural, religious and historical beliefs.
Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua & Siuslaw Indians Const. pmbl., available
at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/coos_umpqua siuslaw const.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2004).
191. One means of illustrating these differences is to compare the mission statements of
major civil rights organizations with those of major tribal Indian organizations. Compare, e.g.,
Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians, Welcome to NCAI ("NCAI's mission is to inform the public and
the federal government on tribal self-government, treaty rights, and a broad range of federal
policy issues affecting tribal governments."), available at http://www.ncai.org/index.asp (last
visited July 1, 2003), with Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Const. for
College Chapters art. II (Feb. 2000) ("The purpose ... [of] the [NAACP] shall be to improve
the political, educational, social and economic status of minority groups; to eliminate racial
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furthermore, the inherently demarcating nature of geopolitical sovereignty,
which is central to tribal life and identity. 92 To be sure, the possession and
exercise of tribal sovereignty quite clearly proclaim that tribal members
comprise a separate people, politically, culturally, and historically distinct from
the neighboring non-Indian communities and, to a large extent, from every other
tribe. 93
Needless to say, this formulation of separationism differs starkly from
the theories of autonomy or equality that are generally employed to defend the
types of non-Indian separationism sometimes advanced under the
multiculturalist banner.194 This difference is more than stark. It is also highly
significant. For the approach to separationism held by certain multiculturalist
(especially civil rights) proponents not only rests on notions of autonomy or
equality. By definition, it extends no further than the logical perimeter of these
notions, and there is no particular incentive for these proponents to reshape it
according to the unique characteristics and substantial demands of tribal
sovereignty.
In addition, the attempt to bring tribal interests within the
multiculturalist platform may be not simply inefficacious, but also quite
harmful. This is true in at least two respects. First, multiculturalism will
necessarily respect tribal beliefs and practices only to a point, and those which it
finds categorically objectionable, it will attempt to eradicate. Despite its
particularist dimensions, in fact, multiculturalism is functionally similar to any
other comprehensive or quasi-comprehensive worldview. As one commentator
has observed:
Multiculturalism correctly exposes the false claims of universality in
dominant institutions, which in fact represent the culture of dead
prejudice; to keep the public aware of the adverse effects of racial discrimination; and to take
all lawful action to secure its elimination ...."), available at http://www.naacp.org/
work/youth college/CC.pdf. Likewise, commentators have noticed the fundamental
differences between, for example, the goals of the civil rights protests and those of the
Wounded Knee occupation, see Deloria & Lytle, supra note 190, at 12-13, or between the
justifications for the civil rights "sit-ins" and those for the Indian "fish-ins." See id. at 235.
192. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that "[t]ribes' survival depends on
maintaining our unique relationship to this nation as independent, self governing peoples").
193. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) ("Although no longer
'possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,' they remain a 'separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social relations."') (quoting United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)).
194. See James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights 103 (1998) ("Most
arguments for minority cultural rights among political theorists today take one of two forms-
an autonomy-based, freedom-of-association rationale or an equality-based rationale.").
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White European males; however, it simply replaces that dead White
European male culture with an equally particularistic elite liberal
cosmopolitan culture that it then declares to be universal.
Multiculturalism is highly selective in the attributes of diverse
cultures that it selects for inclusion, and its evaluative criteria are
highly particular.1
95
Nowhere has this been more evident to date than in the realm of
gender. Far from embracing the different, seemingly traditional roles accorded
to women within certain tribal cultures, some feminist critics have simply added
these cultural aspects to the list of beliefs and practices that should, by legal or
extra-legal pressure, be marginalized or eliminated. 196 Likewise, despite the
legal and rhetorical emphasis on tribal self-determination and self-government
in recent decades, few progressives have objected to the imposition of various
Westem legal notions and limitations upon tribal legal or governmental
systems.1
97
Second, the multiculturalist incorporation of tribal interests may be
harmful to the extent that it renders the public, including the nation's legislators
and judges, unable to discern the critical and distinguishing attributes of tribes,
especially those relating to sovereignty. By conceptualizing Indians as yet
another racial or ethnic minority, and then by approaching their grievances
using the standard grammar of discrimination, inequality, and structural racism,
multiculturalism creates or perpetuates among non-Indians the view that tribal
Indians are, in fact, simply one among many racial or ethnic groups battling
against past and present bias. At the same time, the sovereign nature of tribes
and the unique geopolitical history of tribal-federal relations become
195. Anthony D. Taibi, Racial Justice in the Age of Global Economy: Community
Empowerment and Global Strategy, 44 Duke L.J. 928, 958 (1995).
196. See Bradford, supra note 169, at 559 n.34 (explaining that, in reaction to Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1978), "[e]nraged white feminists suggested
that a tribe that discriminates against women is not entitled to acceptance within a
multicultural, liberal state; some even argued that Indian culture should be 'sanitized' and
'restructured' legally to accord women equal protection as a matter of U.S. constitutional
law") (citing Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 725 (1989)); Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges, Farm
Wives, and the Dann Sisters' Last Stand: American Indian Women's Resistance to
Domestication and the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 637 (1999)
(responding to this phenomenon).
197. A prime example is the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2004),
which essentially subjects tribal government actions to statutory analogs of selected Bill of
Rights constraints. In this vein, see Carla Christofferson, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect
Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 Yale L.J. 169
(1991).
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increasingly abstract, if not irrelevant, and treaty-based rights and obligations
become seemingly unjustifiable forms of racial favoritism.' 98 In short, "[t]he
failure ... to appreciate the difference between Indigenous people as a race and
Indians as citizens of separate sovereign nations... confuse[s] the message sent
to American society about Indigenous political status and thereby
compromise[s] the existence of Indigenous sovereignty." '' 99
Yet, it is precisely "the existence of [tribes'] governing power... that
[has] enabled them to evade the potential conflict between special rights for
Indians (e.g., tax exemptions, freedom from state laws, health and education
benefits) and the prevailing American legal values favoring racial equality,"
such that "the continued force of elements of American law valuable to Indian
people (such as retention of special rights to ancestral lands) depends in part on
the perpetuation of Indian sovereign authority. 200  Finally, the public
association of tribes with multiculturalism not only creates a risk that they will
be conceptually reduced to self-segregating racial coalitions; it also links their
future to the future of multiculturalism itself. In other words, the public
perception and tolerance of tribes and their separate existence may rise and fall
198. See Carter, supra note 58, at 7 (explaining that "a lack of public understanding
[about the legal status and governmental powers of tribes] means that headline Indian law
news often confounds and sometimes outrages non-Indians, especially when the political
status of tribes is not understood and outcomes appear to reflect unfair racial preferences")
(footnote omitted); Porter, supra note 96, at 154-58. See also John Craig, Great Divide:
Tribal Members, Non-Indians Struggle To Find Common Ground on Reservations,
Spokesman Rev., Dec. 26, 2000, at Al ("Some non-Indian property owners on reservations
resent rules that disenfranchise anyone who doesn't have at least 25 percent Indian blood.
They also complain about job preferences for tribal members and other privileges on the basis
of race."), available at 2000 WL 29146886. This may be especially true in light of the
enhanced economic, legal, and political position of many, though certainly not all, tribes. See
Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal Power Over
Children, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 927, 939 (1999) (noting that "[tribes'] growing power today has
highlighted the anomaly of recognizing unique rights for tribal members in a larger society
formally committed to equality").
199. Porter, supra note 96, at 156. "Sending confusing messages to American society
relating to questions of Indians and race threatens Indigenous sovereignty because Americans
as a general matter are so ignorant about the subject." Id. at 158. Part of the problem, as well,
involves the use of the term member rather than citizen to describe one's relationship to a
tribe; the former fails to denote sovereignty of a group and is also the term used to describe
one's relationship to a racial or ethnic minority or to an organization. See Robert Fairbanks,
Native Peoples Must Exert Political Will To Stop Assimilation, Ojibwe News, Dec. 1, 1995, at
4 (noting that "most of the Ojibwe people who live in northern Minnesota are 'members,' not
citizens, of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe"), available at 1995 WL 15460604.
200. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 79, at 1126.
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with the public perception and tolerance of multiculturalism, the latter of which
to some extent already seems to have fallen out of favor.2 °'
B. Future Normative Possibilities
Given this exposition of convergences and divergences, it is now
possible to assess more judiciously the alternative future stances vis-d-vis the
multiculturalism movement that tribes or their members may adopt. Indeed,
while this exposition sheds significant light on this actual (and complex)
relationship, it does not necessarily dictate the proper trajectory of that
relationship in a normative or prescriptive sense. The purpose of this Section is
to assist tribes in charting such a trajectory. It will do so by proposing three
normative models of the multicultural-tribal relationship--association,
avoidance, and appropriation-and by critically assessing their respective
advantages and disadvantages for tribes.20 2 Based on this assessment, and on the
substance of Parts II through IV.A, the Article will contend that the third model,
appropriation, most adequately addresses the concerns at hand and most closely
embodies the degree of moderation and circumspection that these concerns
demand.
1. Association
One option for tribes is to adopt a model of association, which would
entail their conscious and public affiliation with the multiculturalism
movement. Although such affiliation may be either active or passive, or in
varying degrees both, the basic idea is that tribes generally would offer no
resistance to their inclusion, much less their participation, in the positions,
literature, or activities of the movement. To some extent, an associational
approach has already been employed by some Indian groups. For example, the
Native American Journalists Association in concert with analogous groups
201. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of
Backlash, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1467, 1469-71 (1996) (noting various developments). Regarding
views within higher educational institutions, see Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset &
Neil Nevitte, Diversity and Affirmative Action: The State of Campus Opinion, Acad.
Questions, Fall 2002, at 52.
202. These models obviously do not exhaust the options for tribes. Rather, they are
archetypes in relation to which particular tribal circumstances, perspectives, and objectives
can be evaluated.
[35:589
2004] MULTICULTURALISM AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 649
representing other ethnicities has attempted to diversify the nation's
newsrooms.
20 3
The principal justifications for adopting this approach-indeed, the
principal reasons that one joins forces with any movement or organization-
would presumably include a natural affiliation with the existing constituents of
the movement, a belief in the premises or perspectives that support the
movement, and a desire to obtain the benefits that the movement seems to offer,
including the attainment of its objectives. Accordingly, a logical method for
assessing the propriety of this approach is to examine the extent to which each
of these justifications is satisfied. As the following paragraphs will show, the
empirical relationship between multiculturalism and Indian tribalism is, on all
three counts, sufficiently conflicted and multidirectional that full-fledged
association cannot easily be supported.
The first two considerations-whether there is a natural affiliation with
the movement and whether there is a belief in its underlying premises-were
effectively covered in Section A, and that coverage revealed that they do not
predominantly point in a single direction. Tribal Indians do to some degree have
a natural affiliation with multiculturalism and do subscribe to some of its
premises, but by the same token they materially differ from every other
multiculturalist constituent. Furthermore, they clearly do not accept (and in fact
likely reject) some of its more philosophically radical yet central premises.
Given the conflicted nature of these first two considerations, therefore, the
propriety of an associational approach may very well hinge on the third
consideration, namely, the extent to which tribes would incur benefits or
burdens by an affiliation with multiculturalism, whether from the achievement
of multiculturalism's objectives or otherwise.
As it turns out, association could produce several benefits, some of
which, arguably, have already been realized. Among other things, these can
include: an increased societal awareness that tribes exist at all (a fact not
necessarily known by all Americans), much less that they are culturally,
economically, and politically robust; a decrease in discrimination in
employment and in the provision of public and private services; the addition of
Indian perspectives to social institutions, such as the media and the educational
system; an increased visibility of positive role models for Indian youth; the
ability to form coalitions with like-minded groups to achieve otherwise
unattainable objectives; and, of course, the enrichment of tribal culture by the
203. See, e.g., Diversity in the Newsroom-ASNE May Retreat from Previous Goals,
NAJA News, Sept. 30, 1998, at 7 (setting forth the views of the Native American Journalists
Association on racial diversity), available at 1998 WL 12439575.
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voluntary exposure to the experiences and cultures of their multicultural
partners.
At the same time, an associational approach clearly creates a number
of potential costs or risks. As noted earlier, for example, multiculturalist
association may lead to the perception that Indian or tribal classifications are
merely racial or ethnic in character, especially from the viewpoint of those
citizens (i.e., most citizens) who lack sufficient legal, historical, or experiential
understanding to avoid drawing that inference. (Among those citizens who
already believe that tribal classifications are nothing but racial or ethnic,
moreover, an associational approach would simply, in their view, support their
position.) This perception, in turn, can generate a variety of adverse
consequences. On the social front, it can lead to claims of reverse
discrimination or race-based welfare, while on the legal front, which is often not
far behind the social front, it can lead to a decreased likelihood that additional
Indian-based legislation would be enacted and an increased likelihood that
existing legislation will be amended, narrowly construed, or in some cases even
invalidated.
Linking one's interests to the multiculturalism movement may also
mean inadvertent alignment or association with a variety of positions,
commonly or generally held by other members of that movement, that conflict
with the positions or interests of tribes. Many multiculturalists, for example,
appear also to consider themselves environmentalists (as, presumably, do a
number of Indians). Yet modem environmentalism, as expressed through
regulatory laws and through concepts such as environmental racism or
environmental justice, can in many instances be adverse to Indian political or
economic interests relating to the development or management of Indian
lands. 204 This can also be the case with other progressive movements, such as
those relating to: women's rights, which may conflict with tribal cultural
norms;205 artifacts preservation, which may conflict with tribal repatriation
efforts;206 and animal rights,20 7 which may conflict with both traditional Indian
204. See, e.g., Dan McGovern, The Battle Over the Environmental Impact Statement in
the Campo Indian Landfill War, 3 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 145, 147-48 (1995)
(explaining how the environmental racism paradigm does not necessarily translate to Indian
reservations, where the economic benefits of landfill siting accrue directly to the tribe); Eric
K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev.
311,339 (2001).
205. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
206. See Weaver, supra note 165, at 160-74 (discussing such controversies); Dussias,
supra note 173 (canvassing historical and current conflicts); Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note
204, at 339 n.173 (noting environmentalist opposition to the repatriation of Indian sacred
objects and cultural patrimony).
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harvesting rights20 8 and Indian religious practices.20 9
Even more problematic than these potential incompatibilities is that the
ultimate fate of tribal sovereignty under an associational approach would to
some extent be tied, for better or worse, to the fate of multiculturalism. At least
two concerns-abandonment and exploitation-arise in this regard. First, as
discussed, multiculturalism may in the future enjoy much less public favor than
it does presently, and the concern is that an abandonment of society's
multiculturalist commitment may, if the associational road is taken, lead to a
corresponding abandonment of its commitment to tribal sovereignty and
separatism. Second, there should also be a concern that certain multiculturalists,
particularly those advocating ethnicity-conscious measures such as slavery
reparations, racial separationism, or bilingual education, will attempt to exploit
the superficially similar characteristics of Indian tribes as a basis for realizing
their agenda.210 Not only would these attempts further fuel the perception that
Indian tribes are simply racial minority factions, if successful they would
effectively erase the fundamental justifications of difference between tribes and
207. See Robert F. Blomquist, Cloning Endangered Animal Species?, 32 Val. U. L. Rev.
383, 400 n.55 (1998) (noting the relationship between the animal rights movement and other
movements relating to race, gender, sexual orientation, and the like).
208. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing a suit by various
animal conservation groups regarding the federal government's approval of a whaling quota
for the Makah Tribe); Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah
Indian Tribe Goes Whaling, 25 Am. Indian L. Rev. 165 (2001); Lawrence Watters & Connie
Dugger, The Hunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of Native American Treaty Rights and the
International Moratorium on Whaling, 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 319 (1997); Yamamoto &
Lyman, supra note 204, at 339 n. 173 (noting "the simmering dispute between native gatherers
and proponents of endangered species protection and animal rights").
209. See Antonio M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental
Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 771 (1995);
Tina S. Boradiansky, Comment, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally
Protected Wildlife, 30 Nat. Resources J. 709 (1990).
210. For efforts to bolster the black claims for reparations by referencing the
relationships between the federal and tribal governments, see Anthony E. Cook, King and the
Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
959, 972 (2000) (arguing that "[a] Black Reparations discourse . . . could lead to greater
solidarity with other historically oppressed groups like Native Americans, Hispanics, Asians,
women, and the poor of all races who have constructed their own narratives of oppression"
and that, "[i]ndeed, some [of these groups] have already demanded and received some form of
reparations"); Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African Americans, 41 How. L.J. 479,
480 (1998) (arguing that via the Indian Claims Commission and in other ways "Native
Americans have been compensated and continue to seek reparations") (citation omitted). For
comparable efforts to defend race-matching in non-Indian adoptions by looking to the Indian
Child Welfare Act, see Metteer, supra note 122, at 66-67 (noting this with particular regard to
black advocates of race-matching).
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non-tribal entities, thus compromising the conceptual and rhetorical basis for
tribal sovereignty. And if that basis or understanding becomes sufficiently
eroded by virtue of these and other extrinsic forces, it is unlikely that tribal
sovereignty will survive in any meaningful, enforceable sense.
2. Avoidance
A second relational model may be labeled avoidance or disassociation.
This approach, which is essentially the opposite of the first, would entail the
deliberate and possibly public disavowal of any meaningful relationship with
the multiculturalism movement or its proponent organizations. Contemporary
examples of avoidance in other contexts, in which one group affirmatively
disassociates itself from a larger movement or coalition of groups, include
intradenominational religious schisms in which a minority faction explicitly
breaks with its church, 2 " and the self-separation of radical environmental or
animal rights groups from their respective mainstreams.212 Needless to say, the
reasons that a tribe might select this model largely correspond to the reasons
that it might reject the model of association, namely, disagreement with
multiculturalism's premises as well as concerns about the long-term damage to
the tribe's legal status that such association might create.
As much of this Article has illustrated, at the center of these
disagreements and concerns is the issue of tribal sovereignty. One commentator
has bluntly explained the matter as follows:
While sympathetic to the objectives of the Civil Rights Movement,
Indian tribes are less interested in professing victimhood and framing
their claims to fit the African American boilerplate of oppressed
racial group seeking integration in the dominant culture than they are
211. See John Nelson Norwood, The Schism in the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1844:
A Study of Slavery and Ecclesiastical Politics 82 (1923) (describing how the Methodist
Church became strongly divided over the issue of slavery); Ephraim Radner, The End of the
Church: A Pneumatology of Christian Division in the West 1 (1998) (providing a theological
account of divided Christianity). Although such schisms may often appear to center around
one or more specific issues of conflict (e.g., abortion, homosexuality, and so forth), in reality
there is typically present a more fundamental conceptual division over the nature of authority
or the interpretation of sacred text.
212. Within environmentalism, for example, the group Earth First! fits a disassociational
or avoidance model. See, e.g., Why Earth First!?, at http://www.earthfirstjoumal.org/
efj/primer/WhyEF!.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004) (explaining that "Earth First! takes a
decidedly different tack towards environmental issues").
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in developing a theory of legal mobilization that jibes with the
political goal of self-determination.
213
Avoidance, though undeniably overbroad, would clearly allow tribes to pursue
their unique objectives free from the potentially divergent interests of
multiculturalism, and free from the risk that they will be incorrectly perceived
as simply another aggrieved minority.
Such a perception would be incorrect precisely because tribes, having
independent legal and geopolitical significance, are materially and often
manifestly different from all other groups.214 Even where it appears that tribes
are acting like other historically oppressed minorities-when seeking payments
from the federal government, for example, seemingly akin to the reparations
sought by some black Americans 2 15-such is often not the case. Ordinarily the
tribal claim is one of intergovernmental obligation pursuant to a valid treaty,
ratified by sovereigns and presumptively enforceable at law. This is quite
different from the black reparations claims, which basically involve the
monetary quantification of a moral injustice 216 and which may or may not have
any actual legal footing.21 7 As the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged:
[R]egardless of whether there are factual similarities between the
treatment accorded Indian Tribes and African American slaves and
their descendants . . ., there is nothing in the relationship between the
United States and any other persons, including African American
slaves and their descendants, that is legally comparable to the unique
213. William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1,
133 n.618 (2002) (citing Vine Deloria, Custer Died for Your Sins 168 (1969)).
214. See Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 250 ("American Indian people are
not simply another 'minority,' defined as an ethnic group or an economic class, because tribes
possess a nation-to-nation political relationship with the federal government.").
215. See supra note 210.
216. Morality is not irrelevant to the interpretation of Indian treaty claims. Normally,
however, it does not provide a freestanding argument, but rather reflects "the idea that treaties
impose upon parties the ongoing moral obligation to act in fairness and in good faith."
Bradford, supra note 213, at 133 n.621.
217. To date, reparations-related claims have been met with little, if any, success. See,
e.g., Wilkins v. C.I.R., 120 T.C. 109, 112 (2003) (concluding that "[t]he Internal Revenue
Code simply does not provide a tax deduction, credit, or other allowance for slavery
reparations"); Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432, 441-44 (2002) (upholding the denial
of compensation to descendants of slaves under the Civil Liberties Act, which provides
redress from the internment of Japanese Americans during World War It), aff'd, No. 02-5134,
61 Fed. Appx. 705, 2003 WL 1878947 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2003) (per curiam), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 226 (2003).
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relationship between the United States and Indian Tribes. Courts
have recognized fiduciary responsibilities running from the United
States to Indian Tribes because of specific treaty obligations and a
network of statutes that by their own terms impose specific duties on
the government. Similar strictures do not appear in the Thirteenth
Amendment alone, or in combination with the other Civil War
amendments and the various Civil Rights Acts which have been
enacted in the meantime.
2 18
The reparations issue is particularly illustrative because, the more
closely one examines the issue, the clearer it becomes how uniquely
problematic it could be for Indian tribes. For example, "payment of reparations
might obviate recognition of any continuing [federal governmental]
responsibilities under the trust doctrine, including programs to aid tribes in the
transition to self-determination. 2 1 9 Even more significant is that the money
obtained through a reparations process "cannot be directed to the satisfaction of
the harms of which Indians complain: most seek to exercise the rights to self-
determine and to express their unique cultures and religions upon sacred
ancestral lands. 22°
Two other considerations also appear to point strongly towards
avoidance as the proper approach. First, multiculturalism is not an
uncontroversial movement, and multicultural affiliation is therefore not a
costless or riskless undertaking. This is not an inherently pivotal consideration
until one further recognizes that the possible cost of such affiliation-what
tribes would be risking-is a diminishment of their sovereignty. Second, and
more importantly, it is not self-evident that Indian tribes actually need
multiculturalism in order to maintain or appreciate the integrity of their culture,
much less their legal standing.221 This, too, is not a minor point. Given the risks
noted above and repeatedly throughout this Article, it becomes almost rhetorical
to ask why tribes, without needing to do so, would voluntarily associate with a
movement that presented these very risks.
Of course, avoidance, like association, would not be free from its own
costs or risks. One obvious cost is simply the foregone series of benefits
identified under the associational model, although some of these benefits (like
218. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
219. Bradford, supra note 213, at 133.
220. Id.
221. See 1 Jessica L. Darraby, Art, Artifact, and Architectural Law § 6:71 (Supp. 2003)
("America has an indigenous culture that predates colonialism, and Native Americans have
historically claimed their culture, or attempted to do so, well before the advent of
contemporary multiculturalism.").
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decreased discrimination) would likely be realized regardless of the level of
affiliation. A more serious cost may be the perception, by the multiculturalist
community and perhaps others, that tribes are fundamentally self-serving and
exclusive-that they are more interested in furthering their economic, political,
and territorial aims than they are in advancing collective goals such as equality
and justice or in bettering the existence of other oppressed groups. 2 22 In turn,
not only would tribes forego potential political allies through avoidance, they
might also create mild adversaries who could indirectly or even directly obstruct
the realization of their objectives. At the very least, tribal avoidance may create
the perception that tribes are unappreciative of the civil rights gains that have
been achieved to date and the extent to which Indians have benefited from the
efforts of multiculturalists and their predecessors.
3. Appropriation
The final normative model of tribal-multicultural relations is
appropriation, which can be defined as the cautious, pragmatic, and
instrumental availment of multiculturalist endeavors to the extent that they
advance a tribe's long-term interests, such as the preservation or enhancement
of its legal sovereignty, intergovernmental relations, or territorial integrity.
Given the shortcomings of the first two models, and for the reasons discussed in
the following paragraphs, this Article will propose that an appropriative
approach is in fact the most desirable option for tribes and tribal members, even
though it, too, is not without its own costs or risks.
Before describing what an appropriative model might entail, it is
important to explain why it is arguably the best option for tribes when
determining their role in a particular multicultural endeavor. At the outset, the
appropriative approach gains broad support from two interrelated propositions.
The first is that the models of association and avoidance are both too extreme
and too sweeping to serve as practical frameworks for tribal action. This fact is
illustrated simply by examining the costs of each model. Full-fledged
association would potentially entangle tribes in a variety of issues and relations
that are either irrelevant or harmful to tribal sovereignty and self-governance,
while full-fledged disassociation would cause tribes to forego a number of
valuable opportunities and beneficial relations, some of which, if pursued, could
very well advance tribal sovereign interests. The very extremism of these
222. Indeed, as Professor Tsosie asks of Indian sovereignty in general, "do our notions
of 'separatism' in Indian law conflict with contemporary movements for multicultural
constitutionalism that speak of multiple political groups engaged in a dialogical relationship
with one another?" Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism:
Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 357, 404 (2003).
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alternatives suggests the impropriety of each. This is especially true in light of
the fact that at issue is the decisionmaking of political entities (tribes), and
political decisionmaking by its nature must always exhibit some degree of
pragmatism, flexibility, and temperance, qualities that do not self-evidently
describe the first two approaches.
The second proposition, which is related to the first, is that the models
of association and avoidance are not sufficiently self-serving with respect to
tribal interests. That is, they do not make tribal interests, and in particular tribal
sovereignty and security, the centerpiece of the inquiry. This is critical precisely
because the nature of sovereignty, as philosophically imbedded in the nation's
Constitution and as practically demonstrated by the conduct of nation-states, is
that it tends naturally towards self-interest. There is, in fact, no better exemplar
of this conception than the United States and its self-determining approach to
obligations pursuant to foreign treaties, various U.N. mandates, and, ironically,
bilateral treaties with Indian nations, which Congress may unilaterally abrogate
subject only to deferential judicial review and potential external constitutional
limitations.
Having explained why appropriation appears to be the most suitable
approach, it is also important, in closing, to provide some sense of how this
approach might operate and, as with the other two models, to identify both its
costs and its benefits. In terms of operation, an appropriative approach would
proceed on a case-by-case basis, scrutinizing any given multicultural
endeavor-be it a potential affiliation, a pending legislative bill, a legal
challenge, or an expression of protest-in terms of its possible effects on the
tribe's long-term geopolitical interests. There might very well be a presumption
against participation, rebuttable where these effects are neutral to positive,
especially if there are secondary short-term benefits that would flow from the
endeavor. Or, a tribe might simply adopt a disinterested posture in every
instance. In all events, the judgment reached would reflect a pragmatic
disposition and an overwhelmingly instrumental valuation of the proposed
undertaking.
The benefits of an appropriative approach are essentially two-fold.
First, it is the approach most suitable for a sovereign (at least within the
Western tradition), and by adopting it, tribes would be expressively and publicly
fulfilling the political persona or status that by historical and legal entitlement
they already possess. Second, as noted, its incremental and pragmatic character
would help tribes avoid the extremism and overbreadth that necessarily attend
the other two models. By the same token, an appropriative approach more
readily allows tribes to make erroneous as well as correct judgments when
assessing their relationship to particular multicultural undertakings. Of the
three, it is arguably the third that demands the greatest degree of vigilance and
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prognostic skill, although once again these are merely aspects of the discretion
and diplomacy that characterize the decisionmaking of a truly autonomous
sovereign. Finally, as with avoidance, appropriation will likely not be viewed
kindly by other constituents of the multiculturalism movement, given its self-
serving, contingent nature. True as this may be, however, the problem arguably
stems not from the tribes' misperception of their relationship to their would-be
fellow multiculturalists, but rather from their would-be fellow multiculturalists'
misperception of the fundamental and quite different nature of tribes.
V. CONCLUSION
"[A] page of history," wrote Justice Holmes, "is worth a volume of
logic. '2 3 In no other legal-cultural domain has this maxim been more true than
in the field of Indian-Western relations. Time and again, despite reversals of
policy and rhetoric to the contrary, these relations have been defined by
coercive efforts to assimilate tribal Indians into Western culture and society.
Yet, if this maxim is in fact true, then one could surmise from this history that
Indian tribes and their members, contrary to the prevailing ethos of self-
determination, remain at genuine risk of assimilation-of losing their distinct
political, cultural, and historical identities and, ultimately, their legally
recognized sovereignty.
Against this historical backdrop, of course, the means of assimilation
today would necessarily be more subtle and the process correspondingly more
incremental. One would like to believe that methods such as the compulsory
allotment of tribal lands, unilateral termination of tribal status, and forced
removal of Indian children from their tribes are confined to the past. 24 But
assimilation need not be so overt or physical, nor must it always assume a legal
guise. As multiculturalists themselves would presumably agree, assimilation
can also occur conceptually and rhetorically through ideas and words and by the
gradual transformation of cultural understandings. 225
223. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
224. See David W. Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the
Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928 (1995) (chronicling the off-reservation boarding
school experience and efforts at reform); Allison M. Dussias, Let No Native American Child
Be Left Behind: Re-Envisioning Native American Education for the Twenty-First Century, 43
Ariz. L. Rev. 819, 831-32 (2001) (recounting the history of off-reservation education).
225. See, e.g., Fairbanks, supra note 199 (contending that the singular use of "Indian" in
federal law to describe all native peoples "has resulted in the political homogenization of the
various Native American peoples" and that "most North American native peoples, regardless
of their cultural disparity or geographical dispersion, have adopted the term 'Indian' in
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One mode of contemporary assimilation may very well be the
multiculturalism movement itself,2 6 which can promise many things, but
cannot ensure-and may even undermine-the continued legal distinctiveness
of tribes. As this Article has shown, its convergences with Indian tribalism run
only so deep, and beneath these similarities there exist multiple and often
significant divergences that ultimately render multiculturalism potentially
deleterious to tribal sovereignty. This is not to impugn the motives of those who
support Indian inclusion within the multiculturalism movement, most of whom
are presumably well-intentioned. But, so also were many of the proponents of
prior assimilation and termination efforts. As one author notes, "assimilation [in
the late 1800s] was the product of compassionate and well-meaning whites who
sought to improve the lives of Indians.... [T]he most disastrous policies for...
[Indians] were not the exclusive product of frontier villains but were created,
supported, and ultimately adopted by pro-Indian, friendly, Christian
reformers.' 227 The termination program of the 1950s, likewise, drew support
referring to themselves" thereby making "the federal objective of assimilation . . . nearly
complete").
226. Another is Indian gaming, despite its obvious and often significant economic
benefit for tribes. See Karin Mika, Private Dollars on the Reservation: Will Recent Native
American Economic Development Amount to Cultural Assimilation?, 25 N.M. L. Rev. 23
(1995); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics
of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 381 (1997);
see also Naomi Mezey, Note, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through
Indian Gaming, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 728-30 (1996) (noting the critique of traditionalists).
However, as one scholar notes,
it is potentially misleading to claim that gaming tribes face a stark choice
between economic development and assimilation. A more accurate
statement would be that gaming tribes face a choice between economic
development that is pursued without attention to tribal culture, and
economic development that is designed to be compatible with cultural
identity and to maintain tribal control over the pace and direction of
cultural change.
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Development at the Bingo Palace, 29
Ariz. St. L.J. 97, 113 (1997) (footnote omitted).
227. Greg Overstreet, Re-Empowering the Native American: A Conservative Proposal
To Restore Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Reliance to Federal Indian Policy, 14 Hamline J. Pub.
L. & Pol'y 1, 14 (1993) (quoting Rennard Strickland, Friends and Enemies of the American
Indian: An Essay Review on Native American Law and Public Policy, 3 Am. Indian L. Rev.
313, 314 (1975)). Conversely, the reasons for ceasing the assimilation efforts were not, in
retrospect, particularly laudable either. See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of
Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an
Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 863, 923 (1993) (attributing the
termination of assimilation programs to declining "private access to Native American lands";
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from many quarters, including self-styled progressives.228 It is, therefore, not
simply enough to be benevolent in spirit;229 one must also always be cognizant
and ever-solicitous of the unique juridical status of Indian tribes, the
complicated path of federal-Indian relations, and, ultimately, the historically
manifest differences between tribal Indians and other minorities or subcultures
within the United States.230
In light of this historical reality as well as various contemporary
concerns, this Article has proffered and critiqued three archetypal approaches to
multiculturalism that tribes and their members may employ. Which path to
take-association, avoidance, appropriation, or an entirely different approach-
is, of course, a decision that each tribe must make, and this Article, though
"the emergence of a racist perspective that Native Americans could not reach the
accomplishment levels of the white race"; and "the fading of religious and scientific
transcendent ethics, the increasing secularization of society, and studies by anthropologists
and ethnologists which contributed to the public's awareness of the depth, complexity, and
uniqueness of the Native American cultures.") (footnote omitted).
228. See Deloria & Lytle, supra note 190, at 16-17 (noting both conservative and
especially liberal support for termination); Kenneth R. Philp, Termination Revisited:
American Indians on the Trail to Self-Determination, 1933-1953 (1999).
229. Cf Overstreet, supra note 227, at 13-14 ("[T]he seemingly good intentions of the
assimilation policy produced the disasters of the Allotment era because, . . . 'purity of heart
does not automatically guarantee wisdom of policy [and] . . . the most benevolent purposes
have produced laws with the most malevolent results."') (quoting Strickland, supra note 227,
at 315). In the words of two scholars, one's "understanding of the status of Indian tribes and
Indian people in America" must not merely be "just . . . and humane"; it must also be
"accurate." Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 250.
230. To be sure, there is nothing radical to the concept that tribal Indians enjoy a
distinctly legal and political status as compared to the nation's other minority divisions. To
overlook this essentiality, in fact, one must be either wholly oblivious to the history of federal-
tribal relations or effectively blinded by the perceived correctness of one's agenda. In this
regard, it is interesting to note that some of today's strongest proponents of conceptually
racializing or ethnicizing Indian identity include both opponents of affirmative action and
opponents of robust tribal sovereignty. See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and
"Preferential" Treatment, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 943, 951, 954-55 (2002).
[Senator Slade] Gorton and others who deny the legal, political, and
historical status of tribes as sovereigns are committed to reducing tribal
nations to polities with no sovereignty, limited or otherwise--or perhaps
even to oblivion. Some proponents of contemporary termination argue
that tribes should have no standing at all, as governments, and that Indian
individuals should be distinguished by nothing more than a particular
"ethnicity," rather than a treaty-based political relationship with the
United States.
See Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 57, at 219.
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favoring appropriation, has not attempted to simplify the decision through either
omission or hyperbole. Rather, it has attempted to demonstrate that some
decision should be rendered, in light of the social forces at work and the grave
issues at stake, and to make this decisional process more informed, more
critical, and hopefully, in the retrospective view of future generations, more
correct.
